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 John H. Munro 
South German Silver, European Textiles, and Venetian Trade  
with the Levant and Ottoman Empire, c. 1370 to c. 1720:  
A Non-mercantilist Approach to the Balance of Payments Problem 
A recurrent and indeed persistent problem in European economic history 
-- a veritable deus ex machina -- from medieval to modern times – is Europe’s 
supposed ‘balance of payments’ problem in trade with the ‘East’, especially 
with the Islamic ‘East’. The nature of the problem has strongly Mercantilist 
overtones to it: i.e., the Mercantilist view that precious metals – gold and sil-
ver – are not just mediums of exchange but wealth (store of value), the most 
tangible form of wealth, and the key to gaining and maintaining national 
power. So often, in the historical literature, precious metal exports have been 
viewed as a serious drainage of Europe’s veritable life-blood. That very view-
point has influenced, indeed pervaded, the way in which many historians have 
interpreted much of European economic history, from medieval to early-
modern times. 
The best example is the current literature on the debate about the sup-
posed late-medieval ‘great depression’. For such notable economic historians 
as Robert Lopez, Harry Miskimin, John Day, and Peter Spufford have argued 
that the economic contraction and, in their view, veritable ‘economic depres-
sion’ in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was either caused or cer-
tainly greatly exacerbated by a supposedly increased outflow of precious 
metals to the ‘East’.1 Miskimin is particularly ingenious in arguing that, al-
                                                      
1 H. MISKIMIN, Monetary Movements and Market Structures: Forces for Contraction in 14th and 
15th Century England, in “Journal of Economic History”, 24, 1964, pp. 470-490; reprinted in 
IDEM, Cash, Credit, and Crisis in Europe, 1300-1600, London 1989 (Variorum Reprints), no. VII; 
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History of  the Middle East, ed. M.A. COOK, London 1970, pp. 93-128; J. DAY, The Great Bullion 
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though the ‘depression’ commenced with falling population, especially after 
the Black Death, the economic consequences, with changes in relative prices, 
then led to a net outflow of precious metals from northern Europe to Italy, 
whose Mediterranean trade then led to the outflow of an even greater stock of 
precious metals to the Levant, and ultimately to Asia (though, in his view, that 
net ‘outflow’ also involved European trade with the eastern Baltic and Russia).  
As a supposed monetarist who deals with these very problems, I believe 
that such a thesis concerning bullion outflows, in financing deficits in 
Europe’s balance of payments with the ‘East’, gives ‘monetarism’ a bad name. 
That may be surprising to some, for I have certainly published a great deal on 
late-medieval monetary problems, particularly on the related debate concern-
ing the so-called ‘bullion famines’. I must, therefore, re-assert my major con-
clusions. Late-medieval Europe did experience some periodic scarcities of 
coined money — i.e. , when the circulating coined money supply was scarce 
relative to the transactions demand for money – especially during these three 
periods, which were also distinctly deflationary periods: ca. 1320-ca.1340, ca. 
1370-ca. 1420, and ca. 1440-ca. 1470. 
 
The nature and problems of  monetary scarcity and deflation in late-medieval Europe 
I found, however, no compelling evidence that such periodic monetary 
scarcities were due to any pronounced increase in the outflow of bullion in 
European trade and payments balances with the ‘East’. Even if the least-
squares regression trend line of the value of aggregate mint outputs in both 
England and the Low Countries is steeply downward (and with almost identi-
cal ‘b’ co-efficients), as would be fully expected with a continuous decline in 
population, to about 1520, the variations from the trend line do not seem 
consistent with a thesis of worsening deficit in Europe’s balance of payments 
(i.e., with the ‘East’).2 In sum, no one has yet proven that the European econ-
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omy suffered from any relatively larger loss of precious metals in its interna-
tional trade: not when we consider that it had become so much smaller, with 
declining population, over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries, with, consequently, a contracting demand for money.  
Instead, in my view, there were two other, much more compelling factors 
to explain periodic and relative scarcities of coined money. The first was a pe-
riodic if often chronic reduction in the income velocity of money, combined 
with very closely related hoarding.3 As I have contended in several publica-
tions, the ever increasing stain of warfare across the Mediterranean basin and 
western Europe from the 1290s, leading into the far better known Hundred 
Years’ War (1337-1453), so often financed by coinage debasements, and ac-
companied by rising taxation, trade bans and other commercial barriers, had 
three far-reaching consequences for the European economy in the next two 
centuries. The first was a marked increase in transportation and transactions 
costs in international trade; the second, and closely related consequence, was 
a set of various impediments to the flow of bullion and specie in that trade; 
the third was the development of proto-Mercantilist bullionist policies, re-
flecting or inspired by those impediments, that were designed to prevent or 
curb the export of precious metals and encourage their inflow (more specifi-
cally into the ruler’s mints). Those policies merely severely to exacerbate in-
ternational conflicts and to promote more coinage debasements – and the 
operations of Gresham’s Law – further reducing the circulation and income 
velocity of money. In other words impediments to the flow of money were 
more important than reductions in the stock of metals.4 
                                                      
3 The income velocity of money is V in the modernized Fisher-Friedman Equation of 
Exchange, the best known version of the Quantity Theory of money: M.V = P.y. Hoarding is 
represented by k in the Cambridge Cash Balances demand-for-money theory: M = k.P.y. In 
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net national income, in the Keynesian equation: Y = C + I + G + (X - M): i.e., national income 
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4 See the sources cited in n. 2 above. For a different view, see J. MUNRO, The Low Countries’ 
Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of  Compara-
tive Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes, in “The International Journal of Maritime 
History”, 11, 1999. 2, pp. 1-30; IDEM, The “New Institutional Economics” and the Changing Fortunes 
of  Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs, in 
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At the same time, the European stock of precious metals, especially sil-
ver, was being reduced by the second problem: problems in European min-
ing, whose technology, in later-medieval Europe, was probably inferior to that 
practised under the Romans. Over the centuries, the chief mines, to be found 
in Germany and south Central Europe, exploited the most readily accessible 
ore seams. Inevitably, as those seams became depleted, most mining enter-
prises experienced diminishing returns, rising marginal costs – and especially 
rising flood waters, since most mines were located in mountainous regions 
with underground streams. To be sure, some new silver mines in Sardinia, 
Bosnia, and Serbia had provided new sources of silver to counteract, in part, 
falling outputs from the older mines. Those new mines offered, however, only a 
temporary palliative, as they, too experienced diminishing returns – and worse. 
Indeed by 1439-41, most of the silver mines of Bosnia and Serbia had fallen 
into the hands of the conquering Ottoman Turks, and the rest by 1459.5 
As I have also argued, the various innovations – chiefly by Italians – in 
medieval credit and banking failed to counteract these periodic scarcities of 
coined money in the late-medieval European economy. In the first place, all 
of the major advances in medieval financial institutions, beginning with de-
posit-and-transfer banking, and the bills-of-exchange banking had already 
taken place before such monetary scarcity became truly acute in the Euro-
pean economy, i.e., towards the end of the fourteenth century.6 Second, credit 
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the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge-New York 2000 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Stud-
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taux précieux des Balkans (XVe - XVIe siècle), in “Annales: Histoire, Sciences sociales”, 60, 2005, 
6, pp. 1277-1297.  With the Ottoman conquest, ‘le déclin des mines était irréversible’ (p.  1291), 
and exports outside the Ottoman domains were forbidden 
6 See R. DE ROOVER,  L'evolution de la lettre de change, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles, Paris 1953 
(S.E.V.P.E.N.); IDEM, New Interpretations of  the History of  Banking, in “Journal of World History”, 
2, 1954, pp. 38-76; IDEM, The Rise and Decline of  the Medici Bank, 1397-1494, Cambridge Mass. 
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remained tied to and a function of the availability of coined money. Peter 
Spufford has clearly made this point in his eloquent comments on the adverse 
economic consequences of hoarding:7 
 
Fear of  disorder made men conceal their coin. Fear of  not being able to replace 
coin made men the keener to keep their assets liquid. With scarcity of  coin went a re-
luctance to spend or invest what one had in hand, so that there was a sluggish circula-
tion, which in itself  was equivalent to a further reduction in the available quantity of  
coin. . ... Finally fear of  the failure to repay cut back on credit. This too was partially 
a consequence of  the shortage of  money and was also a cause of  yet further shortage.  
 
Fully supporting Spufford in his views that the problems from a growing 
scarcity of circulating specie were actually exacerbated by a credit contraction 
that worsened existing deflationary conditions are recent publications of 
Pamela Nightingale, Reinhold Muller, and Frank Spooner. 8 
The most effective proof for the contention that credit and financial in-
stitutions did not counteract monetary contraction in the late-medieval Euro-
pean economy, and indeed that such periodic contractions did take place, is 
the statistical evidence on prolonged deflation. Many economists, especially 
those steeped in the traditions of Classical Economics, would contend, how-
ever, that neither monetary scarcity nor deflation should have posed any 
problems, since presumably all prices and factor costs would have moved di-
rectly together in tandem. But the statistical evidence that I have produced 
for late-medieval England and the Low Countries refutes any such notions 
and demonstrates that because of long-term ‘stickiness’ of nominal money 
wages, interest rates, and rents (i.e., for the latter two, those stipulated in long 
term contracts), deflation increased the real burden of all these factor costs.9 
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9 See J. MUNRO, Bullionism and the Bill of  Exchange in England, cit., pp. 169-239; IDEM, Bullion 
Flows and Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, in Precious Metals in 
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Thus medieval and early modern concerns about the effects of monetary 
scarcity had some real justification. 
At the same time, hoarding was also a rational response to the deflation-
ary consequences of monetary contraction – for indeed, to repeat an earlier 
observation, all three periods of such monetary scarcity listed above were 
eras of stark deflation (with intervening periods of inflation, generally the 
fruits of war-induced coinage debasements). Obviously the fall in the general 
price level – the true meaning of the term deflation – increased the purchas-
ing power of silver, by ounce or gram, in that most of the standard medieval 
moneys-of-account, in which prices were expressed (and by which we meas-
ure deflation), were tied to the currently circulating silver penny (denier, denaro, 
Pfennig, groot). 
 
The problem of  declining mining outputs: Deflation as the spur to technological changes 
Such deflation also helped to provide the solution for problems of late-
medieval monetary contraction. The mid-century, from the 1440s to the 
1460s, marked the nadir of the late-medieval European deflations. Insofar as 
that specific deflation did increase the purchasing power of silver, it thereby 
provided the profit motive for inducing the necessary technological changes 
that created the subsequent South German or Central European silver-copper 
mining boom.10 That revolutionary boom in silver mining outputs was the 
product of two interrelated sets of technological changes. The first was in 
mechanical engineering: the invention of horse-powered and water-powered 
piston-operated drainage pumps, to pump water from much deeper ore shafts 
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up to the surface by stages.11 Water seepage was always a very serious problem 
that had limited the extent of mine shafts in mountainous regions; and a com-
plementary solution was the construction of downward-sloping adits, dug into 
mountain sides, to drain or divert the voluminous underground waters.  
The second technological revolution was in chemical engineering: the in-
vention of the Saigerhütten process of smelting silver-based ores. The basic 
problem that the Central European ore bodies had presented was the mixture 
of silver with copper whose separation could not be effected at reasonable 
cost by any known means. The solution was provided by mixing lead with the 
argentiferous-cupric ores in the smelting process (also made economically 
possible by water-powered piston pumps, to fan the furnace flames of the 
charcoal fuels): the lead combined with the silver, thus separating out the 
copper; and then the lead, with a very low melting point, was readily sepa-
rated from the silver by re-smelting.  
 
The South-German Central European silver-copper mining boom, c.1460-c.1540 
The result of this mining boom was a vast increase – possibly a quintu-
pling – of Europe’s supply of mined silver. According to some estimates that 
I have produced, which inevitably must under-report the actual quantities of 
metals mined, in view of the absence of adequate data for many of the new 
mines, silver outputs from mines in Saxony, Thuringia, the Tyrol, Bohemia, 
Slovakia, and Hungary rose 329.4 percent: from a quinquennial mean of 
12,973.44 kg in 1471-75 to one of 55,703.84 kg in 1536-40, the period of 
maximum outputs. Thereafter outputs fell to a mean of 39,882.76 kg in 1546-
50, by which time cheaper silver was arriving in Seville from the Spanish 
Americas. The noted American economic historian John Nef, the first to at-
tempt a documentation of this silver-mining boom, has provided much 
higher minimum and maximum estimates for a slightly earlier period: in 1526-
1535: between 84,200 kg and 91,200 kg a year.12 
In my view, this South-German Central European silver mining boom 
provides the initial monetary cause of the Price Revolution, which ensued 
from the 1520s – long before any substantial quantity of silver had arrived 
from the Americas. Indeed, the quantity of that European mined silver pro-
                                                      
11 The pumps created a vacuum; and air-pressure, acting against this vacuum, thus lifted 
up the water, from one level of troughs to another. See PH. BRAUNSTEIN, Innovations in Mining 
and Metal Production in the Late Middle Ages, in “Journal of European Economic History”, 12, 
1983, pp. 573-591; and sources in n. 5. 
12 J.U. NEF, Silver Production, cit., pp. 575-591. In his view, even the lower-bound estimate 
represents a quintupling of silver mining outputs from the mid-15th century. JOHN MUNRO  912 
duced during the peak output of the late 1530s would not be exceeded by 
Spanish American imports until the early 1560s.13 
 
The Venetian trade with the Levant: Cotton and the fustians industry in Italy and South 
Germany in the later fourteenth century 
This South-German dominated silver-copper mining boom also provides 
a central theme in this study because of its close connection to later-medieval 
Venetian trade with the Mamlūk Levant, in particular the trade in Syrian cot-
ton, so much of which was sold to textile producers in South Germany. De-
spite a few important, if now older, studies on this subject, most medieval 
economic historians have not given cotton the attention that it deserves, par-
ticularly as a component in the manufacture of relatively cheap, light-weight, 
and very popular Italian textiles known as fustians: with a linen (flax) warp 
yarn and a cotton weft yarn. They were a much softer and finer textile than 
were the purely flax-based linens in the same if somewhat lower price range.14 
The name fustian is thought to be derived from the Cairo industrial suburb of 
al-Fustāt (Fostat), where reputedly this textile industry had its tenth-century 
origins, in using a combination of domestic flax for the linen warp yarns, and 
imported Syrian and/or South Asian cotton for the weft yarns.  
Fustian-manufacturing quickly spread elsewhere in the Mediterranean ba-
sin, but most especially in Lombard Italy. In a study of Genoese trade with 
Sicily, Syria, Egypt, and Constantinople, during the second half of the twelfth 
century, Hilmar Krueger concluded that northern textiles, especially the 
lighter weight and relatively cheap says and serges, had predominated in this 
                                                      
13 J.H. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins, cit., pp. 1-34. Those imports jumped from an annual 
mean of 27,145.03 kg in 1556-60 to one of 83,373.92 kg in 1561-65, thanks to the recent ap-
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Bolivia) and Mexico. 
14 See M. MAZZAOUI, The Cotton Industry of  Northern Italy in the Late Middle Ages, 1150-1450, 
in “Journal of Economic History”, 32, 1972, pp. 262-286; EADEM, The Italian Cotton Industry in 
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Europe: Essays in Memory of  Professor E. M. Carus-Wilson, N.B. HARTE, K.G. PONTING eds., Lon-
don 1983 (Pasold Studies in Textile History, 2), pp. 259-278; W. VON STROMER, Die Gründung der 
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trade, over all Italian and other Mediterranean textiles, of which ‘only the 
Lombard fustians formed an impressive item of export’.15  
Their subsequent importance has been most fully revealed in Maureen 
Mazzaoui’s important monograph on The Italian Cotton Industry, in which she 
contended that by the mid-thirteenth century the Lombard fustian textile 
crafts had become a ‘mass-production’ industry, which then reached its peak 
in the early fourteenth century, when markets in the Mediterranean basin, 
having failed to maintain their former demographic growth, had ceased to 
grow at their former pace, so that they became saturated with a very large 
volume of very similar, indeed undifferentiated, lighter, cheaper, and coarser 
textiles.16 As I have also argued, the subsequent decline in population elimi-
nated the marketing scale-economies necessary to sustain such ‘mass produc-
tion’ industries, while the steep rise in transportation and transaction costs 
that ensued from the widening stain of warfare in the Mediterranean basin 
eliminated profits for most ‘price-taking’ entrepreneurs and merchants in ex-
porting such cheaper textiles – most of which were undistinguishable from 
rival substitute products. Thereafter, the scope of their intentional commerce 
was gradually restricted to the far higher valued luxury woollens and silks, 
whose manufacturers were entrepreneurial ‘price-makers’ engaged in mo-
nopolistic competition, with highly differentiated products. 17 
Lombard cotton-fustian manufacturing, however, continued to retain a 
reasonably viable profitable existence, if on a smaller scale, based on both the 
domestic Italian and nearby South German markets, for about another half-
century, until warfare once again delivered the Italian industry a near fatal 
blow, to the direct benefit of South Germany. The first set of wars were 
those that Louis I ‘the Great’, king of Hungary launched against Venice in 
1356, seizing Dalmatia in 1358; and, with various if changing alliances, he 
threatened Venice’s very existence, until Venice defeated the Hungarians at 
Foss Nouva in 1373.18 During these latter wars (in the 1360s), Louis had 
                                                      
15 H. KRUEGER, The Genoese Exportation of  Northern Cloths to Mediterranean Ports, Twelfth Cen-
tury, in “Belgische tijdschrift voor filologie en gescheidenis/Revue belge de philologie et d'his-
toire”, 65, 1987, pp. 722-750. 
16 M. MAZZAOUI, The Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 87-104. 
17 See J.H. MUNRO, The Low Countries’ Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 
1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of  Comparative Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes, 
in “The International Journal of Maritime History”, 11, 1999, 2, pp. 1-30; IDEM, The “New Insti-
tutional Economics” and the Changing Fortunes of  Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile 
Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs, in “Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
geschichte”, 88, 2001, 1, pp. 1-47. 
18 For Venice’s subsequent dire threat to its existence, in the war with Genoa 1378-81, see 
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gained support from his former father-in-law Emperor Charles IV (King of 
Bohemia, r.1355-78) and from the South German Swabian towns, who had 
been loyal and important customers of Lombard fustians, which they had 
been purchasing chiefly at Venice.  
The second set of wars were those that Charles IV, in alliance with Pope 
Urban V (r. 1362-70) launched against Bernabo Visconti, Signore or ruler of 
Milan – the chief town of Lombardy -- in 1367-69.19 As a consequence of 
these various wars, the trade in Lombard fustians with South Germany became 
periodically disrupted, and very costly to transact. Evidently the major Austrian 
and South German (Swabian) towns therefore chose to establish their own 
fustian crafts as import-substitution industries, in fact replacing their already 
existing coarse linen industries: in Vienna, in 1369; in Augsburg, in 1372; in 
Nördlingen, in 1375; in Landshut and Ulm, in 1375. The necessary flax was 
obtained locally, while the requisite cotton was purchased from Venice.20 
Venice itself had begun importing significant amounts of raw cotton 
from Mamlūk Syria and Palestine, and also Cyprus, just shortly before these 
events, chiefly for sale to the Lombard fustian industries; and Syria-Palestine 
had certainly been the principal source of cotton as well for the Italian cot-
ton-fustians industries. As noted earlier, this region had also been supplying 
the Cairo region with cotton from the tenth century, as well as furnishing the 
raw material for its own textile industries. Italian trade (Pisa and Venice, prin-
cipally) has been well documented for this region during the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries, and even after the Fall of Acre in 1291 (with the ensuring 
papal prohibitions on trade with the Mamlūks, lasting until 1344).21 
Certainly the establishment and evidently rapid growth of the South 
German fustian industries from the 1360s provided Venice with a very strong 
incentive to enlarge its imports of Syrian, Palestinian, and Cypriot cotton. 
Ashtor, in a noted article on this very trade, contends that ‘the great upsurge 
of cotton planting and the export of raw and spun cotton began in the sec-
                                                      
19 W.T. WAUGH, Germany: Charles IV, in The Cambridge Med,ieval History, VII, Decline of  Em-
pire and Papacy, J.R. TANNER, C.W. PREVITÉ-ORTON, Z. N. BROOKE eds., Cambridge-New York 
1958 (Cambridge University Press), pp. 137-154, 148-151. 
20 See W. VON STROMER, Die Gründung der Baumwollindustrie, cit.; K. KELLENBENZ, The Fus-
tian Industry, cit., pp. 259-261; M. MAZZAOUI, The Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 129-153; E. 
ASHTOR, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Princeton-Oxford 1983 (Princeton University 
Press), pp. 92-93. 
21 See above p. 914; and E. ASHTOR, The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria in the Later Middle 
Ages, in “Studi Medievali”, XVII, 1976, pp. 675-715, reprinted in IDEM, Studies on Levantine 
Trade in the Middle Ages, London 1978 (Variorum Reprints CS74), no. VII [same pagination]; 
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ond half of the fourteenth century’, specifying that the major districts came 
to be Aleppo, Latakia, Sarmin in northern Syria, Hamath (or Hamā) in central 
Syria, and Acre in Palestine, where cotton cultivation may have displaced, to 
some extent, grain cultivation, when the Levantine population declined after 
the Black Death and when cotton offered better financial returns in agricul-
ture. Ashtor also contends that Syrian cotton was of a much higher quality 
than that obtained from Anatolia (modern Turkey), Cyprus, Sicily, or Malta. 
Within Syria, Baalbek was the major centre for manufacturing woven cotton 
textiles, which the Venetians also exported, in significant quantities, to various 
European markets.22 
The Venetian cotton trade from the Levant and Cyprus was almost dis-
rupted at the very outset of the burgeoning German demand by a very bitter, 
destructive, and ongoing war between the kingdom of Cyprus (Peter I) and 
the Mamlūk Sultan, which had reached a fever pitch with the Cypriot sack of 
Alexandria in 1365, followed by other Cypriot corsair attacks on Levantine 
coastal towns in 1367 and 1368. The Sultan’s retaliatory measures included 
arrests of all available European merchants, and confiscation of their goods 
and property (in both Egypt and Syria), including those of the Venetians and 
Genoese, whose support of the Cypriots and Catalan allies was, at best, luke-
warm. In June 1369, Genoa and Venice, with full support from Pope Urban 
V, terminated (ostensibly) all trade with the Mamlūk Sultanate. Yet in Decem-
ber 1370 a joint Venetian-Genoese embassy secured a peace treaty with the 
Mamlūks, one that also included Cyprus and Catalonia. According to Ashtor, 
some thirty years of peace and commercial prosperity ensued in the Levant 
trade – though really only after Venice had avoided almost certain destruction 
and defeated its arch enemy Genoa, at the Battle of Chioggia, in 1381.  
 
Venetian trade with the Mamlūk Levant in the fifteenth-century 
During the ensuing decades, the Venetians gradually if surely gained as-
cendancy in the Levant trade, but especially so in the cotton trade. Ashtor es-
timates that in the 1380s the Venetians were exporting about 3,500-5,000 
sacks of Syrian cotton a year, and about 8,000 sacks in the 1390s (and almost 
                                                      
22 IDEM, The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria, cit., pp. 677-685; but Ashtor contends, without 
proof, that ‘the greater part of [the raw cotton] was exported to Europe’, and that ‘the growth 
of the European fustian industry [Italian and German, evidently] gave a strong impetus to this 
branch of the Levant trade’. See IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., Table XII, p. 175, for the price of raw 
cotton in Venice, 1364-1402, with specific prices for cotton from Hamath, Acre, and Sarmin. 
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12,000 sacks in 1400).23 In that very year, this trade was again threatened with 
disaster, by the invasions of the Mongol conqueror Timūr (better known as 
Tamerlane), whose armies conquered Baghdad and Aleppo in 1400 and Da-
mascus in 1401, producing a sharp increase in prices for Syrian cotton. But 
then his armies retreated from the Mamlūk domains to attack the Ottoman 
Turks, capturing their Sultan Beyazid I (at Angora, 1402); and three years 
later, in 1405, while planning an invasion of China, Timūr died – so that the 
Mongol threat quickly evaporated.24 
Whether or not Mamlūk economic fortunes nevertheless declined sharply 
thereafter, as Ashtor maintains, is a still a matter of considerable dispute. He 
argues that a severe economic crisis was precipitated by ‘a crop failure and 
high prices in Egypt in 1403-04 and [was] aggravated by the long civil war 
under the reign of the Sultan Faradj’.25 But his dismal depiction of Mamlūk 
economic and especially industrial decline seems difficult to reconcile with his 
two other contentions. The first concerns the even greater growth in Ve-
netian prosperity, after the death of Timūr, based essentially on the Levantine 
trade, even if that prosperity was partly based on Venice’s skilful diplomacy 
and commercial skills in reducing the extent of Genoese and Catalan compe-
tition; and the second concerns Ashtor’s data on Venetian balance of pay-
ments with the Levant at the end of the fifteenth century, a crucial matter to 
be considered later in this study.  
Undoubtedly, however, Ashtor is correct in emphasising the growing role 
of Syrian cotton in Venetian commerce, contending that ‘the cotton planta-
tions in Egypt and Syria were again increased at the end of the fourteenth 
and the beginning of the fifteenth century’. Certainly, as well, Venetian ex-
ports of Syrian-Palestinian and Cypriot cotton was a very important factor in 
the continued growth of the South German fustian industries. The South 
Germans, it should be noted, came to Venice themselves in order to fetch 
that cotton, which was then transported across the Alps, chiefly by the Bren-
ner Pass route.  
                                                      
23 E. ASHTOR, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 184-189. For the 1390s, Ashtor (p. 199) estimates that 
the total value of Venetian trade with the Levant was 400,000 to 500,000 gold dinars; 200,000 
to 300,000 dinars for the Genoese; and 200,000 to 250,000 dinars for the Catalans; but these 
amounts are influenced by unusually high prices for Asian spices in the 1390s. See also, IDEM, 
The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria, cit., pp. 708-713. 
24 IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 88-102. 
25 IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., p. 204. He cites a Mamlūk census indicating that the number of 
textile looms in Alexandria had fallen from about 14,000 in the 1390s to just 800 in 1434; even 
if this report is valid, some of that decline was due to demographic and not purely commer-
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The South German fustians industry, precious metals, English woollens, and the rise of  the 
Antwerp Market in the mid-fifteenth century 
Certainly, by at least the 1440s, the South German fustian manufacturers 
had expanded to become the single most important supplier of these rela-
tively inexpensive, light, but still good quality textiles for European markets. 
They represent, in fact, the first important example of a cheaper-line textile 
industry that achieved a major growth in output in the later-medieval Euro-
pean economy, whose textiles markets had become so dominated now by 
luxury woollen and silk fabrics. By the early sixteenth century, the Swabian 
city of Ulm was producing over 100,000 pieces annually, an output that was, 
however, according to Mazzaoui, ‘far surpassed by the city of Augsburg’ (for 
which no data are supplied).26 The importance of these South German fus-
tians on the Antwerp market in the mid sixteenth century – when about 
100,000 pieces were sold there a year – is demonstrated in Guicciardini’s fa-
mous survey of that port’s commerce.27  
In order to understand more fully the rise of the Antwerp market, the re-
vival of the European economy from the mid-fifteenth century depression, 
and then the expansion of the entire West European economy into the six-
teenth century, we must now examine in greater depth the following related 
economic factors: the role of South German commerce, especially its role in 
the Central European silver-copper mining boom; the expansion of interna-
tional trade in textiles; and the consequent growth in Venetian-Levantine 
trade, all from the 1460s. 
As Herman Van der Wee has demonstrated in his magisterial Rise of  the 
Antwerp Market and the European Economy, and then in several other publica-
tions, both the European economic recovery and Antwerp’s rise to become 
Europe’s leading financial-commercial centre were fundamentally based on 
the revival and re-establishment of overland, continental trade routes, which 
                                                      
26 M. MAZZAOUI, The Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 140-141; see also K. KELLENBENZ, The 
Fustian Industry, cit., pp. 259-62 (also without data). 
27 W. BRULEZ, Le commerce international des Pays-Bas au XVI siècle: essai d'appréciation quantita-
tive, in “Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire”, 46, 1968, pp. 1205-1221; republished as IDEM, 
The Balance of  Trade of  the Netherlands in the Middle of  the 16th Century, in “Acta historiae neer-
landica: Historical studies in the Netherlands”, 4, 1970, pp. 20-48: from L. GUICCIARDINI, De-
scrittioni di tutti i Paesi Bassi, Antwerp 1567, pp. 124-126. Given the very wide variety of 
commodities sold there, and their relative cheapness, we should not dismiss the importance of 
the fustians merely on grounds of absolute value: about 240,000 Carolus florins or £40,000 
groot Flemish = about 1.3% of the total value of transactions in 1560: 18,500,000 florins = 
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now ran through Germany.28 European economic expansion in the earlier 
Commercial Revolution era, from the twelfth to late thirteenth centuries, had 
been fundamentally dependent on other overland routes, especially the 
French routes running from Flanders through the Champagne Fairs and 
down the Rhone valley route to Marseilles and then Genoa. When the afore-
mentioned European and Mediterranean warfare, from the 1290s, and the 
consequent sharp rise in transport and transaction costs, virtually eliminated 
these routes as major conduits of international trade, diverting that trade to the 
far longer maritime routes, via the Mediterranean and Atlantic routes, not only 
did the Champagne and other international fairs disappear, but, for reasons 
more fully explored in the Van der Wee-Peeters model, the aggregate volume 
and value of international trade also suffered a disproportionate contraction 
(i.e., declined, in their view, more than did the aggregate population).29 
The new overland, continental routes were developed, from the 1440s, in 
a far different trajectory, to the east, one that was now free from the ravages 
of warfare and insecurity: running from Venice, across the Brenner Pass into 
South Germany, and from there, via the Frankfurt Fairs, down the Rhine to 
the Low Countries. They terminated at the combined Brabant Fairs of Ant-
werp and Bergen-op-Zoom, which had earlier begun their existence as purely 
regional foodstuffs fairs . That direct o v erland route, it must be noted, in -
volved a distance that was less than 20 percent of that required by sea (via the 
Adriatic, Mediterranean, Straits of Gibraltar, and the Atlantic). It was also a 
considerably safer, more secure route, involving a greater certainty of time 
spent in transit, a requisite condition for the functioning of regional and in-
ternational fairs.30  
As Van der Wee has argued so cogently, these new overland continental 
trading routes, along with the revival of the continental fairs – at Geneva, Be-
sançon, Lyons, as well as at Frankfurt and Antwerp -- fed into an interlacing 
network of regional trade routes. Thus they promoted a rapid economic ex-
pansion by a macro-economic multiplier-accelerator mechanism; and such 
                                                      
28 H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market and the European Economy, 14th to 16th Cen-
turies, I-III, The Hague 1963, II, Interpretation, pp. 113-161. See the next note. 
29 I DEM, TH. PEETERS, Un modèle dynamique de croissance interseculaire du commerce mondiale, 
XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, in “Annales ESC”, 15, 1970, pp. 100-128. See also a further elaboration of 
these views in H.  VAN DER WEE,  Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade, and 
Particularly in the Re-export Trade from South to North, 1350-1750, in The Rise of  Merchant Empires: 
Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, ed. J. TRACY, Cambridge 1990, pp. 14-
33. See also J.H. MUNRO, Patterns of  Trade, cit., .pp. 147-195; J.H. MUNRO, The Low Countries’ Ex-
port Trade, cit., pp. 1-30; J.H. MUNRO, The “New Institutional Economics”, cit., pp. 1-47. 
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trade involved hundreds of more towns than had been served by maritime 
routes (whose role and significance then waned in Europe itself, from the 
later fifteenth century). For Van der Wee, such trade served as the chief en-
gine of economic growth in early-modern Europe – and not demographic 
factors, for population growth was (in his view and mine) more the conse-
quence than the cause of this aggregate economic expansion. 
Chiefly instrumental in the development of these new overland routes, 
and in the development of the new fairs of Frankfurt and Brabant were the 
Germans – both the Cologne-based Rhenish Hanse and then the South 
Germans, whose leading merchant banking families, the Fuggers especially, 
had secured a dominant role in both the manufacture and trade of the 
Swabian fustians, which they marketed in both sets of these growing interna-
tional fairs. The subsequent rise of the Antwerp fairs in particular to achieve 
commercial and financial dominance in the European economy, from the 1460s 
to the 1560s, was based on a tripod that consisted of, first, English woollens, 
then the South German metals (silver and copper) and fustians, and finally, 
from 1501, Portuguese spices – from their conquests in the Indian Ocean.31 
The English had established the first leg in 1421, when Antwerp became 
the overseas trading staple or entrepot for their woollen cloth exports, under 
the organization of the London-based Merchants Adventurers. Having been 
excluded from Flanders (Bruges) and the Baltic (Danzig) – and the latter had 
seemed so promising for their cloth exports from the 1380s – the English re-
ceived a warm welcome in Antwerp (liberated from Flanders only in 1405), 
chiefly because it no longer had a local woollen cloth industry to protect. For 
reasons that I have explored elsewhere, the English draperies were now pro-
ducing good quality woollens at a much lower price than were their rivals in 
Flanders, Brabant, and Holland, whose luxury-oriented draperies had become 
dependent on heavily-taxed English wools – then the world’s finest wools. 
Indeed, the English cloth industry’s chief advantage was in using these very 
                                                      
31 For the following see: J.A. VAN HOUTTE, La genèse du grand marché international d'Anvers à 
la fin du moyen âge, in “Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire”, 19, 1940, pp. 87-126; H. VAN DER 
WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., II, 73-124; J.A. VAN HOUTTE, Bruges et Anvers: marchés 
`nationaux' ou `internationaux' du XIVe au XVIe siècle?, in “Revue du Nord”, 24, 1952, pp. 89-108; 
J J.A. VAN HOUTTE, Anvers aux XVe et XVIe siècle, in “Annales ESC”, 16, 1961, pp. 248-278; J.H. 
MUNRO, Bruges and the Abortive Staple in English Cloth: An Incident in the Shift of Commerce from 
Bruges to Antwerp in the Late Fifteenth Century, in “Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire/Belgisch 
tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis”, 44, 1966, pp. 1137-1159; J.H. MUNRO, Medieval Wool-
lens: The Western European Woollen Industries and their Struggles for International Markets, c.1000-1500, 
in The Cambridge History of  Western Textiles, I-II, ed. D. JENKINS, Cambridge-New York 2003 
(Cambridge University Press), I, chapter 5, pp. 228-324; J.H. MUNRO, Patterns of  Trade, cit., .pp. 
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same fine wools, the chief determinant of textile quality, tax free. The Eng-
lish also sought to obviate the chief comparative advantage of their Nether-
lander rivals by having more and more of their woollens dyed and finished in 
Antwerp (and in some neighbouring towns). Their chief customers, at the 
Brabant Fairs, came to be the Rhenish merchants who so eagerly bought their 
finished woollens, as their chief return cargo, to be marketed throughout 
Germany and Central Europe. From the 1460s, when the Central European 
mining boom really commenced, South German merchants began to displace 
the Rhenish as the chief customers for English woollens at the Brabant Fairs, 
for the same reasons: as their prime return cargo in exchange for the growing 
quantities of fustians, silver, and copper that they were bringing to Antwerp, 
whose mint re-opened, only in 1467.32 
The consequences, largely unintended, of two related, competitive 
changes in English and Burgundian mint policies, in the mid 1460s, helped to 
promote both a greater flow of South German silver to Antwerp and a boom 
in English cloth exports to the Antwerp fairs. First, in August 1464, the Eng-
lish king, Edward IV (r. 1461-83), debased the English silver coinage – which 
had been untouched since 1412 -- by 20.0 percent. That had the immediate 
effect of lowering exchange rates and thus of sharply reducing the market 
prices of English woollens at the Antwerp fairs, at a time when countervail-
ing deflationary forces in England prevented any subsequent rise in English 
domestic prices.33 Second, Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy (r. 1419-67) 
responded with a set of somewhat lesser debasements in 1466-67, reducing 
the silver contents by 16.9 percent; but more important, his debasements al-
                                                      
32 See the sources in the previous note, and also: J.H. MUNRO, Anglo-Flemish Competition in 
the International Cloth Trade, 1340-1520, in “Publication du centre européen d’études bourgui-
gonnes”, 35, 1995, pp. 37-60 [Rencontres d'Oxford (septembre 1994): L’Angleterre et les pays bas bour-
guignonnes: relations et comparaisons, XVe-XVIe siècle, ed. J.-M.  CAUCHIES]; J.H.  MUNRO,  The 
Symbiosis of  Towns and Textiles: Urban Institutions and the Changing Fortunes of  Cloth Manufacturing in 
the Low Countries and England, 1270-1570, in “The Journal of Early Modern History: Contacts, 
Comparisons, Contrasts”, 3, 1991, 1, pp. 1-74; J.H. MUNRO, The “New Institutional Economics”, 
cit., pp. 1-47. 
33 The silver contents of the English sterling penny were reduced from 0.899 gram to 
0.719 gram; and the value of fine silver rose from £4.634 per kg to £5.793 per kg. The Phelps 
Brown & Hopkins price index in fact fell from a mean of 101.497 in 1461-65 to one of 98.538 
in 1476-80; and, despite some rise in the 1480s (with supply shocks), the mean was still only 
98.538 in 196-1500 (Mean of 1451-75 = 100.0). Data calculated from CH. CHALLIS, Appendix I: 
Mint Output, 1220-1985, in A New History of  the Royal Mint, ed. IDEM, Cambridge 1992, pp. 673-
698; and E.H. PHELPS BROWN, S.V. HOPKINS, Seven Centuries of  the Prices of  Consumables Compared 
with Builders’ Wage-Rates, in “Economica”, 23, 1956, p. 92, reprinted in IDEM, A Perspective of  
Wages and Prices, London 1981, pp. 13-59, but with corrections from data in their working papers 
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tered the bimetallic mint ratio from 11.98:1 to 10:83:1, thereby increasing the 
relative value of silver and thus the incentive to bring South German silver to 
mints in the Low Countries. There was no such incentive to take the silver to 
English mints, because Edward IV’s 1465 debasement (of gold) had also al-
tered the bimetallic ratio in the opposite direction: raising the bimetallic ratio 
from 10.33:1 to 11.16:1.34 Thus increased flows of German silver to Antwerp 
meant an augmented German demand for English woollens. 
The very significant results can be seen in the relevant statistics. English 
broadcloth exports rose from a mean of 29,001.6 pieces (24 yds by 1.75 yd) 
in 1461-65 to one of 62,583.4 pieces in 1496-1500 – a rise of 115.8 percent. 
The English cloth exports finally peaked in 1546-50 at 135,189.50 pieces; and 
over this period, London’s share of total cloth exports, almost all of which 
went to Antwerp, rose from 55.3 percent to 91.6 percent.35 One should also 
note that the first major Tudor enclosure movement, largely then designed to 
produce the wool for cloth manufacturing, almost exactly parallels this ninety-
year sustained cloth export boom. 
In Antwerp itself, its mint outputs rose from an annual mean of 1,475.96 
kg fine silver in 1466-70 (when, to repeat, minting had first re-commenced 
there) to one of 5,262.975 kg in 1476-80 – though some of that was silver 
recycled in coinage debasement. The annual mean of the quantity minted in 
1496-1500, when no significant debasements occurred, was 2,801.05 kg, 
about double that of Antwerp’s initial mint outputs. The total amount of sil-
ver coined in the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands (Brabant, Flanders, 
Namur, Holland-Zealand) in 1496-1500, expressed as a quinquennial means, 
was 5,345.91 kg; and in England, the quinquennial mean output for this pe-
riod was 2,490.94 kg – so that the combined total of fine silver coined in 
these two countries was 7,836.85 kg. For this same quinquennium, the total 
mean quantity of fine gold minted was 753.559 kg: 474.633 kg in the Bur-
gundian-Habsburg Netherlands and 278.926 kg in England.36 
                                                      
34 For mint ratios, calculated in terms of the two pure (fine) metals, see J.H. MUNRO, Bul-
lion Flows, cit., Table 10, pp. 148-52; J.H. MUNRO, Wool, Cloth and Gold, cit., pp. 155-179, and 
Appendix: Table C, pp. 198-199, Table G, p. 204, Tables J-K, pp. 209-210. Note that the bi-
metallic ratios in Table C are based on English and Flemish standards of fineness, not on val-
ues of the pure metals; and therefore they differ from the ones cited here. See also J.H. 
MUNRO, Anglo-Flemish Competition, cit., pp. 37-60; J.H. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins, cit., pp. 1-34; 
H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., II, pp. 119-142. 
35 See sources concerning the textile trades in n. 31; and also J.H. MUNRO, Medieval Wool-
lens, cit., Tables 5.3 and 5.4, pp. 304-307; and also pp. 292-296. 
36 J.H. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins, cit., Table 1.4, pp. 12-13; Table 1.5, pp. 16-17 (but in-
cluding only mint outputs of Flanders and Brabant). JOHN MUNRO  922 
South German silver and Venetian trade with the Levant in the late fifteenth-century: al-
ternative perspectives on the ‘balance of  payments problem’ 
We may compare those statistics with some that Ashtor has supplied to 
estimate Venice’s deficit on balance of payments with the Levant in roughly 
the same period, in the later 1490s, when, according to Ashtor, Venice’s Le-
vant trade had reached its apogee. In several publications, he has provided a 
variety of sometimes confusing estimates of trade balances. In one publica-
tion (1976), he contends that Venice then purchased Oriental goods with a 
total value of about 500,000 ducats in the Levant: about 400,000 ducats in 
spices and dyestuffs, and the other 100,000 ducats in ‘cotton, silk, jewels, and 
potash’(and/or alkalis). He also concludes that the ‘Venetians’ Levantine trade 
had increased by 33% in 100 years’: in part at the expense of Genoese and 
Catalan trade, but also in part in response to a growth in European demand 
for Oriental goods (including cotton).37 In a more recent publication (1983), 
he contended that, in this decade, the Venetian galleys to Alexandria (Egypt) 
and Beirut (Syria) contained cargoes worth between 450,000 and 550,000 
ducats, of which 300,000 to 360,000 ducats were in specie (or coin and bul-
lion): i.e., from 60 to 65 percent of the total value of the cargoes.38 He also 
stated that the total value of European manufactured goods and raw materi-
als – especially in the form of various textiles, glass wares, soap, paper prod-
ucts, grains, timber, iron, and copper – together ‘amounted perhaps to a third’ 
of that total investment.39  
                                                      
37 E. ASHTOR, The Volume of  Levantine Trade in the Later Middle Ages (1370-1498), in “Journal 
of European Economic History”, 4, 1975, 3, pp. 573-612, with quotation on p. 609; reprinted 
in E. ASHTOR, Studies on Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages, London 1978 (Variorum Reprints 
CS74). See also E. ASHTOR, Levant Trade, cit., p. 470, contending that the quantity of pepper 
purchased in the Levant rose from 1,500-2,000 sportas in the early fifteenth century to 2,500 in 
the 1490s; and that the quantity of ginger purchased rose from 2,000 kintārs s to 6,000 or 7,000 
kintārs over the same period; and E. ASHTOR, A Social and Economic History of  the Near East in the 
Middle Ages, London 1976 (Collins 1976), p. 328: contending that Venetian pepper exports from 
Alexandria rose from 283,050 kg in 1396 to 357,300 kg in 1498 (a rise of 26 percent); and that 
ginger exports rose from 36,000 kg in 1396 to 255,240 kg in 1498 (a rise of 609 percent). 
38 IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 476-78. Compare these figures with those given from the 
Morosini chronicles, in A. STAHL, European Minting and the Balance of  Payments with the Islamic 
World in the Later Middle Ages, in Relazione economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico. Secc. XIII - XVIII, 
ed. S. CAVACIOCCHI, Firenze 2007 (Le Monnier, Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. 
Datini”, Atti delle “Settimana di Studi” e altri convegni, 38). For one highly unusual year, 1433, 
following a commercial disruption, the Venetians exported 620,000 ducats in coin and bullion 
and 380,000 ducats worth of goods to the Levant, for a total value of about 1,000, 000 ducats: 
i.e., about the same ratio, here 62% in specie. But the average value of total exports of specie 
and goods to the Levant in the period 141-1431 was only a third of that: about 334,000 ducats.  
39 IDEM, The Volume of  Levantine Trade, cit., p. 611. A NON-MERCHANTILIST APPROACH  923
But these estimates on the value of trade conducted by the costly Alex-
andria and Beirut state galleys do not, therefore, include the value of Syrian 
cotton and some other commodities that, because of low value:weight ratios, 
were necessarily shipped by the much more cheaply operated (and privately 
owned) cogs. Even though Ashtor believed that the aggregate value of the 
cotton traded had declined in the later fifteenth century, because of a steep 
fall in the price of Syrian cotton, he estimates that the value of these cog-
borne cargoes in the later 1490s was about 130,000 to 180,000 ducats a year, 
and thus still a very significant proportion, perhaps as much as 25 percent, of 
the total Venetian trade with the Levant, whose aggregate value thus ‘amounted 
to 580,000-730,000 ducats a year at the end of the fifteenth century’.40  
That would mean an aggregate value of value of the Levantine trade 
(whether measured in imports or exports) amounted, in the weight of fine 
gold, from 2.056.10 kg to 2,587 kg; or, in terms of fine silver, if we use a bi-
metallic ratio of 11:1, from 22,621.10 kg to 28,46.35 kg.41 If we further as-
sume, as a mean estimate, that European specie accounted for 62.5 percent 
(five-eighths) of the value of Asian goods purchased in the Levant, that 
would produce estimates of Venetian exports of either of the following: for 
gold, ranging from 1,285.06 kg to a maximum of 1,617.41 kg; or for silver, 
ranging from 14,135.69 kg to a maximum of 17,191.47 kg. (or some mix of 
the two metals). The estimated amount of gold exported ranges from 1.705 
to 2.146 times as much gold as minted in England and the Habsburg Low 
Countries combined (i.e., 753.559 kg); and similarly the estimated amount of 
silver exported – if all the bullion and specie were in silver – ranges from 
1.804 to 2.270 times as much pure silver as was minted in England and the 
Habsburg Low Countries combined (i.e., 7,836.85 kg). These statistical data 
are best appreciated in the summaries presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
                                                      
40 IDEM, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 476-478 and Table LIV. He also cites an estimate from the 
Mamlūk Sultan Kānsūh al-Ghawri that ‘at the end of the fifteenth century the Venetians in-
vested 300,000 ducats in cash and 300,000 ducats in merchandise every year in the trade with 
Egypt alone. (p. 478). For other estimates, up to a total investment of 1.1 million ducats in the 
Levantine trade, see: IDEM, The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or Pre-Colonialism?, 
in “Journal of European Economic History”, 3, 1974, 1, pp. 5-53; reprinted in IDEM, Studies on 
Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages, London 1978 (Variorum Reprints CS74); IDEM, Profits from 
Trade with the Levant in the Fifteenth Century, in “Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies”, 37, 1975, pp. 250-275, reprinted in IDEM, Studies on Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages, 
London 1978 (Variorum Reprints CS74); IDEM, Les métaux précieux et la balance des payements du 
Proche-Orient à la basse-époque, Paris 1971; IDEM, A Social and Economic History, cit.pp. 319-331. 
41 The Venetian gold ducat contained 3.545 g. of gold, at about 99.48 percent pure. JOHN MUNRO  924 
Consider, at the same time, that the minimum mean quinquennial output 
of the known and documented South German-Central European mines (in 
1496-1500) was 25,759.2 kg fine silver – possibly an underestimate of one 
third (Table 3). So obviously not all of that South German silver was flowing 
down the Rhine to the Brabant Fairs; and a very considerable, if unknown, 
amount continued to go to Venice. Indeed, in supplying South Germany with 
the cotton for its fustian industries the Venetians had, in effect, always ex-
changed it for German silver. The vast increase in silver outputs from these 
mines, from the 1460s, thereby increased the German ability to acquire more 
cotton and, more generally, provided the Venetians with the means of greatly 
expanding their trade with the Levant and Cyprus, for cotton. According to 
Maureen Mazzaoui, by the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the Ve-
netians were importing about twice as much cotton (about 4,000 tons or 
about 3,630,000 kg) as they had in the early to mid-fifteenth century.42 That is 
a very, very different question from the traditional view that Venice was ac-
commodating Europe’s short-sighted and greedy demand for spices and 
other Asian luxuries by draining Europe of its life-blood in precious metals, 
if we may apply the standard Mercantilist metaphors – or, in the words of the 
Libelle of  Englysche Polycye (written about 1435-36), ‘as the wasp sucks honey 
from the bee’.43. 
 
Venice and the ‘balance of  payments’ problem with the Levant in the later fifteenth cen-
tury: the role of  silver and the problem of  bimetallic ratios 
In dealing with this Mercantilist ‘problem’, however, we need to find an-
swers to two related questions: why did Europe require so much ‘treasure’ in 
conducting its trade with the Levant, and more generally with Asia; and why was 
such a large proportion in the form of silver? The typical or standard answer to 
                                                      
42 M. MAZZAOUI, Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 51-52. From the Sarrono firm’s record: an 
estimate of 1,980 tons of raw cotton per year in the early fifteenth century; from various esti-
mates: about 4,000 tons in the late fifteenth century (2,250 tons from Cyprus and Smyrna); and 
again, citing Frederic Lane, about 4,100 tons in 1560 (13% of total ship tonnage of 31,564 
tons). See also F LANE, Cotton Cargoes and Regulations against Overloading, in Venice and History, Bal-
timore 1966 (Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 253-262; and IDEM, Venice: A Maritime His-
tory , Baltimore 1973, pp. 480-481. 
43 The Libelle of  Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on the Use of  Sea-Power, ed. G WARNER, Oxford 
1926, pp. 21-22, condemning Italian merchants who ‘bere the golde oute of thys londe, and 
souke the thryfte awey oute of our honde [hand]; as the waffore [wasp] soukethe honye fro the 
bee, so mynuceth oure commodite [so diminishes our wealth]’. See also G.. HOLMES, The ‘Libel’ 
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the first is that many parts of Asia, from Japan to Persia, or indeed to Egypt in 
the west, had their own highly developed manufacturing industries; and thus 
Europe had little to offer the Asians, at competitive prices. As we shall see, if 
such arguments apply to the later trade of the Dutch and English East India 
Companies, they do not apply as much to European trade with the Levant. 
Since, however, Asian spices played such a major role in both the Levant 
trade – possibly over 75 percent by value for Venice’s trade – and the later 
East India Company trades (up to the 1670s), we need a more concrete 
measure of their astonishingly high values, especially in the fifteenth century, 
compared to their values today. The best way of making that comparison is 
to relate spice prices, then and now, with the purchasing power of skilled la-
bour: master masons and carpenters, whose occupations have changed little 
over the ensuing centuries (except for twentieth-century mechanization). 
Thus in 1438-49, such building craftsmen could have purchased, with their 
full daily wage (12 hours), only 65.3 grams (0.065 kg) of cloves in Antwerp 
and 75.6 grams in London; and 241.1 grams of pepper in Antwerp and 284.6 
grams in London. But in Toronto, in December 2005, a master carpenter 
could have purchased, with his daily wage (8 hours), 6,381.1 grams (6.381kg) 
of cloves and 12,234.1 grams (12.234 kg) of pepper.44 Clearly a revolution in 
the spice trade has occurred in the intervening period, but chiefly with the 
nineteenth-century transportation revolutions (i.e., steam shipping). 
The answer to the second major question, concerning the choice of pre-
cious metals to be exported, is also far more clearly established for eastern 
than for western Asian (Levantine) commerce. The very marked difference in 
bimetallic ratios certainly indicates that silver was generally always scarcer and 
thus relatively more valuable – in terms of both gold and commodities – in 
eastern Asia than it was in Europe. For example, in both China and Japan, the 
bimetallic ratio during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century was gener-
ally 8:1 or 9:1 – i.e., meaning that a kilogram of silver was worth as much as 
                                                      
44 Based on data given in H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., I, Appendix 
no. 26:1, pp. no. 309; 26:6, p. 326; 28:2, pp. 351, Synoptic Tables, p. 458; J.E.  THOROLD 
ROGERS, A History of  Agriculture and Prices in England, IV, 1401-1582, Oxford 1882, pp. LON-
DON GUILDHALL MANUSCRIPTS LIBRARY: MS 5174, vol. 1; Brewers’ Guild, Warden’s Accounts 
(1424-1562); Corporation of London Record Office: Bridge Master’s Account Rolls, 1381-
1398; Bridge Master’s Accounts: Weekly Payment Series, 1404-1510 (Vols. I-III); Toronto Car-
penters’ Wages: Carpenters Union, the District Council of Ontario (whose assistance is grate-
fully acknowledged). JOHN MUNRO  926 
1/8th or 0.125 kg of gold – compared to a bimetallic ratio of about 11.5:1 in 
western Europe during the early sixteenth century.45  
If the Europeans had maintained a preference for shipping silver rather 
than gold to the Levant,46 the thin and sometimes conflicting evidence avail-
able on late-medieval bimetallic ratios would seem to justify such a preference 
more in the fourteenth than in the fifteenth, at least according to that sup-
plied by Jere Bacharach.47 His tables for Mamlūk Egypt indicate that the bi-
metallic ratio was generally 9.3:1, from 1313 to 1403, and consistently so from 
1341. Andrew Watson had earlier produced a somewhat similar table for 
Mamlūk Egypt, indicating a low bimetallic ratio of 8.3:1 from 1340-1360, a 
very high and isolated one of 12.4 for 1368-69, and thereafter, a lower ratio 
of 9.6:1, to ca. 1400.48 Spufford, however (and citing neither), has produced a 
table that indicates far higher bimetallic ratios: of 11.3:1 in 1375, 14.7:1 in 
1384, but falling to 12.7:1 in 1399. Those bimetallic mint ratios may be com-
pared to those that he has presented for Venice: widely fluctuating ratios that 
ranged from a high of 14.2:1 in the period 1305-1330, to a low of 9.4:1 in 
1350; but thereafter that ratio rose and hovered about 11:1 into the early fif-
teenth century.49 In Flanders, the bimetallic ratio had also fallen to a similar 
low of 9.68:1, enduring from 1390 to 1418; and in England, the bimetallic ra-
tio had fallen from 11.16:1, one maintained from 1346 to 1412, to one of 
10.33:1,for the ensuing period of 1412 to 1464.50 
                                                      
45 K. YAMAMURA, T. KAMIKI, Silver Mines and Sung Coins: A Monetary History of  Medieval and 
Modern Japan in International Perspective, in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, 
ed. J. RICHARDS, Durham 1983 (Carolina Academic Press), pp. 329-362, Tables 9-10, pp. 345-346. 
46 See E. ASHTOR, The Venetian Cotton Trade in Syria, cit., p. 712 : ‘Insofar as cash payments 
are concerned, it seems that most of them were made in silver coins, although often it was not 
coined silver, but silver plates’. 
47 Compare J. BACHARACH, Monetary Movements in Medieval Egypt, 1171-1517, in Precious 
Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICHARDS, Durham N.C. 1983, pp. 
159-182, Table 3, pp. 179-181; citing as well E. ASHTOR, Les métaux précieux et la balance des paye-
ments du Proche-Orient à la basse-époque, Paris 1971. 
48 A. WATSON, Back to Gold -- and Silver, in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 20, 1967, 
pp. 1-34, Table 2, p. 27. 
49 P. SPUFFORD, Money and Its Use, cit., Table 7, p. 354; IDEM, Handbook of  Medieval Ex-
change, London 1986 (Royal Historical Society), Table II: Venetian Gold:Silver Ratios, 1305-
1509, p. lxiii. Spufford also cites Ashtor as a source, and another article by Bacharach, but not 
the one cited here, in n. 53. See also A. WATSON, Back to Gold, cit., Table I, pp. 23-25: Silver-
Gold Ratios in Europe, 1100-1400; and S. PAMUK, A Monetary History, cit., pp. 22-26, 43-45 (on 
Egypt and the later 14th-century ‘silver famines’. 
50 J.H. MUNRO, Bullion Flows, cit., Table 10, pp. 148-52. As noted earlier (see p. 923), that 
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In Mamlūk Egypt, however, during the early fifteenth century – specifi-
cally the years 1403 to 1410 -- the bimetallic ratio had briefly risen to an as-
tonishing high of 14:1: this time, according to all three historians (Bacharach, 
Watson, Spufford). Certainly in this period (and indeed even later), the Vene-
tians were exporting considerable quantities of gold ducats to the Levant.51 
Then the bimetallic ratio fell very sharply, to reach a temporary low of 7:1 in 
1414, while fluctuating thereafter until the 1430s, when (according to 
Bacharach) it maintained a generally stable level of 10.1 to 10.3:1, over the 
next several decades.52 In 1453, when the famous French merchant-financier 
Jacques Coeur was on trial for violating the ban on bullion exports, accused 
of having shipped 20,000 silver marcs (weighing 4,895 kg) to Syria, thereby 
having ‘desnué [dénuder] nostre dit pais du Langudeoc’, he admitted that it 
was very profitable to do so, because when silver was worth six gold écus in 
France it was worth seven écus in Syria.53 
Support for that view may be found in the sudden rise of the bimetallic 
market ratio in the Burgundian Low Countries in the 1440s and 1450s: from 
10.87:1 to 11.98:1.54 Meanwhile, in Venice the bimetallic ratio had also risen: 
                                                      
51 See in particular L.B. ROBBERT, Monetary Flows – Venice, 1150 to 1400, in Precious Metals in 
the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICHARDS, Durham North Carolina 1983 
(Carolina Academic Press), pp. 53-78, p. 74, estimating that in the early 1420s, the Venetian 
mints issued 1,200,000 gold ducts and 800,000 ducats worth of silver coins, of which ‘Venice 
annually exported 300,000 ducats’ worth to Egypt, to Syria, and to her own Aegean posses-
sions, and to England’; but that estimate in part relies on the questionable validity of Doge 
Tommaso Mocenigo’s ‘Deathbed Oration’. See A.M. STAHL, Zecca: The Mint of  Venice in the Mid-
dle Ages, Baltimore-London 20000 (The American Numismatic Society-The Johns Hopkins 
University Press), pp. 369-406, esp. p. 406, contending that the supposed current mint produc-
tion ‘of 200,000 gold ducats, and the silver issues [including] 500,000 ducats’ worth of [silver] 
grossi going to Syria and 100,000 ducats’ worth of [silver] soldini and mezzanini going to the 
Terrafirma, the Levant, and England respectively... are significantly higher than any we have 
seen throughout the Middle Ages and are certainly in contrast to contemporary characteriza-
tions in legislation of the gold and silver mints as being “in desolation and reduced to almost 
nothing.” The monetary situation presented in the arenga represents at best the exaggeration of 
a statesman wishing to put the best light on his accomplishments; more probably it results 
from the efforts of men of a later age to depict his reign as a “golden age” of the mint of 
Venice’. (p. 406). 
52 J. BACHARACH, Monetary Movements, cit., Table 3, p. 180; P. SPUFFORD, Money and Its Use, 
cit., Table 7, p. 354: giving ratios of 8.1:1 in 1415, 10.7:1 in 1416-21, 7:1 in 1422-24, and 11:1 in 
1425-38 (when his series ends); A. WATSON, Back to Gold, cit., Table 2, p. 27: giving only two 
ratios for Egypt and Syria: 14.1:1 in 1404-05, and 8.0:1 in 1422. 
53 Ibid., pp. 20-21: ‘Il a prouffit a porter argent blanc en Suyrie, car quand il vault 6 escus 
par deca il en valut 7 par dela’: citing archival documents (Département de la Loire), and M. 
MOLLAT, Les affaires de Jacques Coeur: Journal deu Procureur Dawet, Paris 1952. 
54 J.H. MUNRO, Bullion Flows, cit., Table 10, p. 151. JOHN MUNRO  928 
from 10:6:1 in 1429 to 11.4:1 in 1449-52, and to a peak of 12:1 in 1445-60.55 
Very shortly thereafter, the European bimetallic ratios began to fall (despite 
the ensuing Central European Silver Mining boom). As noted earlier, the 
Burgundian ratio was reduced to 10.83:1 in 1466-67, reaching a low of 
10.25:1 in 1495; in 1500, it was increased sharply to 11:14:1, while the English 
bimetallic ratio was restored, in 1465, to the former level of at 11.16:1 (re-
maining at that ratio until 1542).56 In Venice, the ratio fell slightly to 11.91:1 in 
1463 (after which the only recorded ratio is 10:7:1 for 1509).57 In Mamlūk 
Egypt, on the other hand, the bimetallic ratio rose from 10.3 to 11.1:1 in 
1483, and then sharply to 12.5:1 in 1498 – indicating that silver had now be-
come relatively cheaper in the Levant than in western Europe (if only tempo-
rarily; for the bimetallic ratio recorded for 1507 is a very low 8.5:1).58 What 
metals then predominated in this Levantine trade are obviously difficult to 
determine, but presumably the proportions of the two metals differed con-
siderably from those of the later seventeenth-century East India Company 
trades in the Indian Ocean, whose evidence will be examined briefly at the 
end of this study. 
Another important difference between the Levantine and Indian Ocean 
trades was that the even vaster land mass that came to be incorporated into 
the expanding Ottoman Empire – including all the Mamlūk domains in the 
Levant, after the Ottoman conquests of 1517 – proved to be such a very im-
portant market for European wool-based textiles.59 Indeed, the principal the-
sis advanced in this paper is that such a growth in textile exports led to a 
relative reduction in the quantity of precious metals that was necessary to 
conduct this trade with the Ottoman Empire. The evidence will show at least 
that the extent of the ‘balance of payments’ deficit in European trade with 
the Levant and other zones within the Ottoman Empire was on a far lower 
order of magnitude than that experienced by the English and the Dutch East 
India companies in their trade with Asia in the seventeenth and early eight-
                                                      
55 P. SPUFFORD, Handbook of  Medieval Exchange, cit., Table II, p. lxiii. 
56 J.H. MUNRO, Bullion Flows, cit., Table 10, p. 151. 
57 P. SPUFFORD, Handbook of  Medieval Exchange, cit., Table II, p. lxiii. We may assume a bi-
metallic ratio of about 11:1 in the 1490s. 
58 J. BACHARACH, Monetary Movements, cit., Table 3, p. 180. Neither Watson nor Spufford 
provide any mint ratios for Egypt in this period. 
59 Ashtor found that, although the Venetians in the fifteenth century exported large quanti-
ties of fustians, chiefly Lombard, only rarely are they found in Venetian galley shipments to the 
Levant (but perhaps they would have been shipped in cogs?). See E. ASHTOR, L’exportation de tex-
tiles occidentaux dans le Proche Orient musulman au bas Moyen Age (1370-1517), in Studi in memoria di 
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eenth centuries. In part, that European commercial success – i.e., in reducing 
the balance of payments ‘deficit’ – can be explained by very marked differ-
ences in transportation costs, especially for these textiles, with a high 
value:weight ratio. 
 
Transportation and transaction costs in the international textile trade from the later fif-
teenth century 
Thus, any study in the European textile trades with the Levant and the 
Ottoman Empire from the later fifteenth century requires a brief survey of 
the major macro-economic changes and related changes in transport and 
transaction costs. As Douglass North has demonstrated, the transactions sec-
tor of the economy is far more subject to and dependent upon scale econo-
mies than any other sector.60 Demography plays a major role in determining 
such scale economies. Indeed, we may contend that the general recovery of 
Europe’s population, after the late-medieval demographic catastrophes, be-
ginning in Italy from about the mid fifteenth century, and in northwestern 
Europe, from the early sixteenth century, aided by the relative diminution in 
warfare (after the end of the Hundred Years war in 1453), reversed the late-
medieval contractionary forces and thus led to a revival of the commercial 
structures that had prevailed in the earlier, thirteenth-century ‘Commercial 
Revolution’ era. In so doing, they also produced a very significant reduction 
in transaction costs in international trade: all the more so when that sixteenth-
century population growth was manifested with a disproportionate degree of 
urbanization, thus providing much larger, more concentrated, and more effi-
cient urban markets. 
Those reductions in transaction costs were aided by significant techno-
logical advances in both transportation and communications. In maritime 
commerce, by far the most important was the development, from about the 
1450s, of the three-masted, fully-rigged and heavily-armed ‘Atlantic’ ships 
(with combined square and lateen sails), especially the carracks and galleons, 
which, according to Frederic Lane led to a 25 percent reduction in shipping 
costs, including implicit insurance costs, with much greater safety, by the early 
                                                      
60 See D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of  the Western World: A New Economic History, Cam-
bridge 1973, pp. 71-96, 134-138; D. NORTH, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York 
1981, chapters 1-5; IDEM, Government and the Cost of  Exchange in History, in “Journal of Eco-
nomic History”, 44, 1984, pp. 255-264; D. NORTH, Transaction Costs in History, in “Journal of 
European Economic History”, 14, 1985, pp. 557-576; C.G. REED, Transactions Costs and Differen-
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sixteenth century: so important for the trade in both cotton and wool. These 
ships allowed Europeans to dominate the world’s shipping lanes for the next 
four centuries.61 Equally important were innovations in overland, continental 
trade: especially, the establishment of professional, specialized cartage firms, 
which used the new, larger-scale, lower-cost Hesse wagons (carts), in well or-
ganized convoys. These firms offered merchants fully insured passage for 
their goods at predetermined, fixed rates, with reliable travel schedules; and 
they also provided an efficient overland postal service. They soon made the 
continental overland routes both speedier and more reliable than Atlantic 
shipping routes from north-west Europe into the Mediterranean.62 To these 
may be added the subsequent ‘financial revolution’ in the development of 
fully negotiable credit instruments, in both private and public finance (rentes), 
and financial exchanges, from the 1520s, which contributed to a fifty-percent 
                                                      
61 F. LANE, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of  the Renaissance, Baltimore 1934, pp. 26-28; I-
DEM, Technology and Productivity in Seaborne Transportation, in Trasporti e sviluppo econommico, secoli 
XIII-XVIIII, Atti della quinta settimana di studio, Istituto internazationale di storia economica “F. Dati-
ni”, Prato 1973, ed. A. VANNINI MARX, Florence 1986 (Le Monnier, Istituto Internazionale di 
Storia Economica “F. datini”, Atti delle Settimane di Studi e altri convegni, 5), pp. 233-244; 
republished in F. LANE, Studies in Venetian Social and Economic History, B. KOHL, R. MUELLER eds., 
London 1987 (Variorum Reprints); R. UNGER, The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600, Lon-
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in The Political Economy of  Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750, ed. J. TRACY, 
Cambridge 1991, pp. 228-275. 
62 The chief hindrance to long-distance maritime commerce was the inability to calculate 
longitude, thus requiring mariners to follow the far longer distance coastal routes. For the evi-
dence on lower transport and transaction costs, see the following: H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  
the Antwerp Market, cit., II, pp. 177-94, 325-364; H. VAN DER WEE, J. MATERNÉ, Antwerp as a 
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461-491; IDEM, The Balance of  Trade, cit., pp. 20-48; IDEM, De firma Della Faille en de internationale 
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reduction in real interest rates by the mid-sixteenth century, by which time 
interest payments on loans had become fully legal in the Habsburg Nether-
lands (to 12 percent) and in England (to 10 percent).63 
Just as the forces for economic contraction and disruption had so seri-
ously hindered long-distance trade in the cheaper line textiles, by increasing 
transaction costs during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, so the 
reversal of these forces, and the ensuing fall in transaction costs, in the later 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, promoted a renewed expansion in the inter-
national commerce in such textiles, particularly Geman (and Italian) fustians. 
Following the great success of the South German fustians was the remark-
able revival of Hondschoote’s sayetteries and similar Flemish draperies légères. By 
the early to mid sixteenth century, they had displaced both the traditional 
woollen draperies de luxe and the so-called nouvelles draperies to become deci-
sively the leading textile industry of the southern Low Countries. Most of 
these exported semi-worsted serge cloths: with a long-stapled worsted 
(combed) dry warp and a short-stapled (carded) greased weft. They were far 
lighter and far cheaper than traditional woollen broadcloths, though not as 
cheap and light as pure worsteds. As had been true in the thirteenth century, 
so the major market for the product of Low Countries’ sayetteries proved to be 
the Mediterranean basin in general, and then the Spanish colonies in the 
Americas.64  
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Subsequently, as will be noted, this Flemish industry suffered a severe 
blow with the Revolt of the Netherlands against Spanish rule, from 1568 to 
1609, when so many textile artisans fled Flanders to seek refuge both in Hol-
land and in England (East Anglia), introducing in both regions the so-called 
‘New Draperies’.65 In England itself, the subsequent rapid expansion of the 
New Draperies took place when the Old Draperies, producing the traditional, 
fine quality, heavy-weight woollens, were beginning to decline; and those 
changes represent by far the most important industrial transformations in 
Tudor- Stuart England.  
Both phenomena, though chiefly resulting on the demand side from 
structural changes in international trade, were also the consequences, on the 
supply side, by the contemporary Tudor-Stuart enclosure movement. Because 
of both selective breeding to produce bigger sheep for urban meat markets 
and improved livestock feeding techniques, much of England’s wool produc-
tion ultimately underwent a remarkable transformation: from being predomi-
nantly very fine, short fibred wools (from small sheep with sparse pastures) to 
becoming much longer-stapled, coarser, strong wools (from large, well-fed 
sheep). That meant that most English wools, by the seventeenth century, had 
become more suitable for the production of long-stapled worsteds than for 
short-stapled fine woollens.66 The role of both sets of English draperies in 
Mediterranean and Venetian trade, especially with the Ottoman Empire, dur-
ing the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, will be the penultimate ob-
ject of this study, which first, however, requires an examination of Venice’s 
woollen cloth production and trade. 
 
The rise of  Venetian cloth production in the sixteenth century: warfare and the Sella thesis 
The apparently sudden rise and very rapid expansion of the Venetian 
woollen cloth industry during the early and mid sixteenth century, and then 
its equally rapid decline in the seventeenth century, is certainly one of the 
very most fascinating events in the history of early-modern Mediterranean 
trade, and especially the trade with the Levant and Ottoman Empire. In the 
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English-speaking world certainly by far the best known history of this Ve-
netian cloth industry was that written by the Italian-born scholar, Domenico 
Sella.67 Thanks to his own research, and to that of several other Italian schol-
ars, we now possess a remarkable annual series of Venetian woollen cloth 
outputs from the early sixteenth to early eighteenth centuries (Table 5).68  
Sella’s basic thesis, to explain the rise of the Venetian cloth industry, again 
concerns the impact of warfare, from Charles VIII’s French invasion in 1494 
to the peace finally established in 1559 by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. 
He contended that Venice, so well protected and isolated in its lagoon setting, 
took advantage of the devastation that the various French, Imperial, and 
Spanish invasions wrecked upon the previously predominant woollen indus-
tries, above all in Florence, but also in several other Tuscan and Lombard 
towns. Venice had never before maintained a cloth industry of any great in-
ternational importance. In the later medieval era, its own small textile industry 
had specialized in manufacturing very costly, ultra-luxury woollens, especially 
scarlets, woven from the finest English wools. Sella contends that in the fif-
teenth century, its ‘annual output never rose, so far as is known, beyond 3,000 
cloths’, an amount he compares to Venetian purchases and re-exports of 
some 48,000 cloths ca. 1420.69 Thus, in Sella’s view, these sixteenth-century 
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wars allowed Venice to replace all other Italian cities to become the over-
whelmingly decisive leader in exporting fine woollen cloths, especially to the 
Ottoman Empire (including the Levant, from 1517).  
That thesis unfortunately ignores the damages that Venice herself suf-
fered during some of these wars, indeed in narrowly escaping total annihila-
tion – in the greatest threat to its existence since the Battle of Chioggia 
(1381).70 First, in 1508, Venice faced a seemingly invincible coalition of very 
hostile and very formidable enemies: the Holy Roman Emperor (Maximilian), 
France (Louis XII), the Papacy (Pope Julius II), and the King of Hungary, 
who had formed an alliance by the Treaty of Cambrai, with the objective of 
recapturing or seizing Venice’s recent Italian acquisitions, outside her tradi-
tional her traditional ‘Venetia’ jurisdiction. In May 1509, the French- led army, 
at the Battle of Agnadello (on the Adda), utterly defeated the Venetians, who 
were forced to abandon the entire mainland. Although this coalition soon 
dissolved, rent by conflicting rivalries, Venice – now stripped of her papal ter-
ritories – found herself again at war with the French, who again defeated the 
Venetians, at the Battle of Marignano, in September 1513. But, fortunately 
Venice was spared further losses by the 1516 Concordat of Bologna in 1516. 
These wars may explain why the very first recorded output, in that same year 
– just 1,310 pieces in 1516 – was so very small. 
 
The Ottoman and Portuguese threats to Venetian prosperity in the Levant Trade 
Furthermore, Venice had already been severely threatened – in both mili-
tary but especially in commercial terms – by a conjunction of other seeming 
disasters at the hands of the Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese. First, as is 
so well known, the Ottoman Turks, under Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451-1481), 
had finally vanquished the remnants of the old Byzantine Empire, in seizing 
Constantinople in 1453, where Venice had long maintained important com-
mercial privileges. He then completed the conquest of Serbia (1459) and 
seized the Morea (1459), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1463-64), the southern 
Crimea (1475), and northern Albania (1478-79). During these later conquests, 
from 1463 to 1479, the Turks were also at war with Venice, seizing in particu-
lar, in 1470, the vitally important Aegean island of Euboea (Évvoia, also 
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known as Negropont); but the Venetians partially compensated for that loss 
by gradually annexing Cyprus (1473-89). 
The next Ottoman Sultan, Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512), struck much more 
disastrous blows against Venice: first in injuring its Levant trade in wars with 
the Mamlūks, in 1485-91, and then, more seriously, by inflicting a decisive de-
feat on the Venetian navy at the Battle of Zonchio in 1499, which led to the 
Turkish conquest of most of the Venetian strongholds in southern Greece 
and many others along the Dalmatian coast. In 1503, a greatly weakened Ven-
ice was forced to sign a peace treaty that ceded more of Greece and the Dal-
matian coast (Albania) to the Ottoman Empire, events that Frederic Lane 
contended produced the ‘turning point of Venetian history’. Worse was still 
yet to come. In 1514, the next Ottoman Sultan, Selim I (r. 1512-20), launched 
an assault on Safavid Persia (1501-1736) and then, with much greater success, 
in 1516-1517, he subjugated the Sherrif of Mecca’s Arabian domains and 
conquered the Mamlūk domains in Egypt, Palestine and Syria (i.e., the Le-
vant). Next to fall to the Turks were Rhodes, in 1522, and Algiers, in 1529, 
conquests that thus allowed the Ottoman Empire to encircle ‘the whole 
Mediterranean Sea from Albania to Morocco’.71 Surely the Venetians could not 
have entertained any hopes of gaining from the hostile Turks the previous 
commercial privileges that they had so long enjoyed in the Mamlūk domains. 
Even before these events, of course, Portugal had already established its 
direct sea route to the East Indies, in 1499-1500, and in 1501 King Manuel I 
established Portugal’s official European staple for Asian spices at Antwerp, 
where Portuguese merchants sought the necessary commodities with which 
to buy those Asian spices: namely, South German silver and also copper – 
similarly scarce in Asia (except in Japan); and of course they also sought there 
the financial services of the Fuggers, Welsers, Hochstetters, and other South 
German merchant banking firms.72 From 1496 to 1502, Venetian spice pur-
chases at Alexandria and Beirut fell by 75 percent; and from 1504 to 1515, 
there were virtually no purchases at Alexandria, and few at Beirut. Indeed in 
1513, only 314,000 lb. of Asian spices entered Beirut, compared to 4,256,000 
lb (1,930,488 kg) that arrived in Europe via Lisbon.73  
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Did the Portuguese therefore succeed in diverting much more of that sil-
ver away from Venetian commerce to the Antwerp market? In the absence of 
direct evidence on silver flows, we can cite some very striking statistics on the 
Fugger House’s exports of Hungarian copper in these years (Table 4): the 
share going to Venice fell from 32.1 percent in 1499-1501 to just 0.29 percent 
in 1516-17 (5.16 percent in 1526-30), while the share going to Antwerp rose 
from 5.22 percent in 1496-1500 to 62.5 percent in 1514-15 (58.4 percent in 
1511-15; 58.85 percent in 1526-30).74 
In view of all these wars and commercial disasters, the subsequent rise of 
the Venetian woollen cloth industry seems all the more remarkable. But let us 
admit at the outset that the Ottoman Turkish and Portuguese threats to Ve-
netian commerce and prosperity were, in fact, ephemeral. Indeed, once again, 
to use the trite phrase, Venice snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. As is 
now so well known, the Portuguese control of the East Indies spice trades 
and of the Indian Ocean shipping lanes, despite superior naval power, with 
their heavily gunned carracks, was at best tenuous. From the 1530s, the Por-
tuguese were no longer able to control the Straits of Malacca or to prevent 
the rapid rise of a rival commercial power in North Sumatra: the sultanate of 
Aceh (Atjeh), which, with Ottoman support, defeated the Portuguese fleet in 
1537. Nor did the Portuguese succeed in controlling the port that governed 
access to the Red Sea: Aden, which also fell to the Ottoman Turks, in 1538. 
Subsequently a Muslim alliance of Aceh, Gujerat (in NW India), and the Ot-
toman Turks succeeded in supplying a steady flow of spices via the Persian 
Gulf routes (despite Portuguese control of Hormuz) and the Red Sea routes, 
via Jedda, which thus reached the Mediterranean ports of Alexandria, Beirut, 
and Aleppo, allowing the Venetians to regain control over half of the spice 
trade -- certainly from the 1550s.75 Obviously Turkish control of all these 
ports did not provide the expected impediment to Venetian commerce; in-
deed, as early as the 1503 peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, the Vene-
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tians had recognized that their only hope of regaining a major share of the 
Asian spice trades lay in co-operation with the Ottomans, in opposing the 
Portuguese.76  
 
The (temporary) decline of  the Florentine and the rise of  the Venetian woollen industry: 
the Chorley Thesis 
The role of the Ottomans in the Venetian textile trades in the sixteenth 
century now requires closer examination. More recently, Patrick Chorley has 
offered an entirely different and, in my view, far more convincing explanation 
for the rise of the sixteenth-century Venetian cloth industry, in terms of gen-
erally very different problems that were plaguing the previously leading textile 
manufacturer: Florence, and specifically its own relations with the Ottoman 
Empire. First, Chorley demonstrated that the Florentine woollen industry 
reached its apogee a full three decades after Charles VIII’s 1494 invasion: in 
the late 1520s, with an output of about 20,000 pieces, perhaps double that of 
a century earlier. Of this industry’s two sections, the much older, more tradi-
tional San Martino branch produced about 4,000 to 5,000 very fine and very 
costly woollens that were still made uniquely from the finest English wools. 
The other newer Garbo branch also produced genuine woollens, but manu-
factured them from a wide variety of wools: domestic Italian (lana matricina, 
from the Abruzzi region), Provençal, Majorcan, and, with increasing impor-
tance Spanish merino wools.77 For reasons that I have recently explored else-
where, these merino wools were now rivalling all but the very finest English 
wools in quality, while selling for a much lower price.78 Since wools were al-
ways the prime cost component in textile production, the panni di Garbo sold 
for far lower prices than did the San Martino woollens. According to Chor-
ley’s estimate, the Garbo branch of the industry, in the 1520s, was accounting 
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for 75 percent of the total production, i.e., about 15,000 woollens, but for 
only 50 percent of the total value of sales, estimated to have been about 
600,000 florins (with the same value as Venetian ducats).79  
Both branches of the Florentine cloth industry, but especially the Garbo, 
had enjoyed a very considerable success in Levantine markets during the later 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.80 The fact that the Italians had been so 
successful in marketing not only their own but other European woollens in 
the Levant is hardly evidence of any Mamlūk ‘industrial decline’, as Ashtor 
has so frequently argued.81 Textile consumption is and always has been, of 
course, universal, and its production virtually so, in thousands of specific va-
rieties, ranging from the very coarsest and cheapest to the very finest and ul-
tra-luxurious (as in woollen scarlets and silks), in a seamless continuum of 
values and prices.82 In medieval and early modern Europe, any given country 
or region produced several varieties of textiles to serve its own domestic and 
also some foreign markets, in terms of specific types and market niches, 
while importing those varieties for which it had no comparative advantage in 
production. The specific advantages of English, Flemish, Dutch, Catalan, and 
Italian woollen cloth industries, in the later medieval and early modern eras, 
was their use of the world’s finest wools: first the English, and then, from the 
sixteenth century, Spanish merino wools, whose quality and fineness were 
vastly superior to those wools available in the Islamic world (but not, of 
                                                      
79 P. CHORLEY, Rascie, cit., pp. 487-526, in particular, pp. 487-89, and Appendix One, 
pp. 515-519. 
80 H. HOSHINO, M. MAZZAOUI, Ottoman Markets for Florentine Woolen Cloth in the Late Fif-
teenth Century, in “International Journal of Turkish Studies”, 3, 1985-86, pp. 17-31. See also H. 
HOSHINO, Industria tessile e commercio internazionale nella Firenze del tardo Medioevo, F. FRANCESCHI, 
S. TOGNETTI eds., Florence 2001 (Leo S. Olschki). 
81 See E. ASHTOR, Levant Trade, cit., pp. 433-512; IDEM, A Social and Economic History, cit., 
pp. 301-31 (esp. p. 329: ‘The slow decay of Egyptian industry and the dumping of European 
and Far Eastern products certainly played their part in this [Mamluk] collapse’); E. ASHTOR, 
L’Apogée du commerce Vénitien au Levant: un nouvel essai d’explication, in Venezia centro di mediazione 
tra Oriente e Occidente (secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e probelemi, Atti dell II Convegno Internazionale di 
Storia della Civiltà Veneziana, I, Florence 1977, pp. 307-326; reprinted in IDEM, Technology, In-
dustry and Trade: the Levant versus Europe, 1250-1500, ed. B.Z. KEDAR, Hampshire 1992 (Vari-
orum Collected Studies Series CS372), esp. p. 319: ‘L’importation des draps occidentaux 
revêtait à la fin du XIVe siècle et au début du XVe siècle le caractère d’un véritable dumping’); 
IDEM, The Economic Decline of  the Middle East during the Later Middle Ages: an Outline, in “Asian and 
African Studies”, 15, 1981, pp. 253-286; reprinted in IDEM, Technology, Industry and Trade, cit.; 
and also IDEM, Studies on the Levantine Trade in the Middle Ages, London 1978 (Variorum Col-
lected Studies CS74). See also IDEM, L’exportation de textiles, cit., pp. 303-377, cited in n. 72 
above. 
82 See J.H. MUNRO, The Medieval Scarlet, cit., pp. 13-70. A NON-MERCHANTILIST APPROACH  939
course, to the cottons and silks). Trade is not a Mercantilist zero-sum game, 
in which the victors gain by imposing their goods on the losers. Trade serves 
to satisfy mutual and differing wants, in order to benefit both sides, indeed in 
what Classical Economists called ‘the gains of trade’, from the ‘law of com-
parative advantage’. Ashtor’s charge of ‘dumping’ is, furthermore, absolutely 
absurd, because abundant evidence of cloth sales in Alexandria and Beirut 
indicate that the prices are equivalent (with added transport and transaction 
costs) to prices in the home countries of the sellers.83 
To explain the sudden decline of the traditional Florentine woollen indus-
tries, and the subsequent expansion of the Venetian, from ca. 1530, Chorley 
cites two major factors. The first, and most important, was the Florentine loss 
of its dominance in those Levantine markets, beginning with a ‘disruption in 
the trade in Iranian [raw] silk’ from an embargo that the Ottoman Sultan 
Selim I had imposed in the years 1514-20, leading to a shift in the silk transit 
trade from Bursa (Constantinople) to Aleppo, where the Florentines ‘had no 
established presence’, but the Venetians certainly did — from the spice trade. 
For some Florentine firms, the Ottoman Turkish share of their exports fell 
from a high of 42 percent, in 1518-32, to 13 percent in 1544. The second was 
Florence’s own internal crisis of the years 1526-30, when bubonic plague 
killed perhaps a quarter of the population. At almost the same time, the 
Spanish-German sack of Rome in 1527, threatening the expulsion of the 
Medici Pope Clement VII, led to a revolution against Medici rule in Florence, 
which was finally and brutally crushed by Papal forces in August 1530.84 
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dieval Woollens, cit., pp. 181-227; IDEM, Spanish Merino Wools, cit., pp. 431-484. 
84 P. CHORLEY, Rascie, cit., pp. 487-491; A.J. GRANT, History of  Europe from 1494 to 1610, 
New York 1951, pp. 136-142, 204-205. See also P. EARLE, Commercial Development of  Ancona, cit., 
p. 37, for further evidence on the sharp decline of Florentine cloth sales, from the 1520s, and 
the growing influx of English woollens (Winchcombe kerseys, panni di Londra, and ultrafini – 
probably Suffolk ultrafine broadcloths). JOHN MUNRO  940 
Venetian cloth production and exports in the sixteenth Century 
In the light of all the foregoing historical evidence, and of the circum-
stances just analysed, we may now better appreciate the significance of the 
(corrected) statistics on Venetian cloth production, from 1516 to 1723 (Table 
5). From that earliest recorded output, production grew from a mere 1,310 
pieces to reach its first peak in 1569, with 26,541 pieces.85 If, however, we 
look at these production statistics in terms of quinquennial means, we find 
that mean annual production did not exceed 10,000 pieces until 1546-50; and 
the much more rapid growth of output from the mid-1540s (to the late 
1560s) may be related to Venice’s ability to regain a significant share of the 
Asian spice trade, via Ottoman ports: i.e., in effect exchanging woollens for at 
least some spices.  
From evidence on cloth widths these appear to be genuine heavy-weight 
woollen broadcloths: 1.80 metres compared to 1.60 metres for the English. 
Such woollens were now, evidently, manufactured chiefly from Spanish merino 
wools (i.e., substituted for the finer English wools); but the production statis-
tics evidently also cover a wide range of textiles, some made from Italian or 
other wools. From the 1550s, according to Panciera, Venice began manufac-
turing cloths of the ‘light draperies’, in imitation of the Flemish Hond-
schoote says, also made from a worsted warp and woollen weft, which were 
also exported chiefly to the Levant.86  
For the peak period of mid-sixteenth century production, in 1566-70, 
quinquennial mean production was 18,513.20 woollen cloths; but production 
had in fact slumped sharply in the year 1570 – at the time of the Ottoman 
seizure of Cyprus and then the Ottoman defeat at maritime Battle of Lep-
anto – to just 9,462 pieces. Cloth production then recovered, but with a 
slower rate of annual growth than before the 1560s, and with a series of of-
ten severe oscillations. That diminished growth rate may reflect the revival of 
Lombard and Tuscan cloth production, after the 1559 Peace of Cateau-
Cambrésis; for we do know that Florence, also selling woollens in Levantine 
markets, had more than doubled its production after 1558: from 16,000 
pieces to about 33,000 pieces in 1561.87 Venetian cloth production itself 
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ducts and Markets (13th - 20th Century), G. L. FONTANA, G. GAYOT eds., Padua 2004 (Libraria Edi-
trice Università Padova), pp. 420-22, 429-31 (Tables 1-2); IDEM, L’Arte Matrice, cit., pp.  39-51. 
87 See P. CHORLEY, Rascie, cit., Table 1, p. 516: in panni corsivi; IDEM, The Volume of  Cloth 
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reached its ultimate peak, of 28,728 pieces, in 1602 – or with a quinquennial 
mean production of 23,572.80 pieces in 1601-05. Production then followed a 
steep downward curve, with some oscillations: to 23,000 pieces in 1620, to 
13,275 pieces in 1630, to 10,082 pieces in 1650, to just 5,226 pieces in 1670, to 
2,033 pieces in 1700, and then to 1,689 pieces, when the series ends in 1723. 88 
 
The decline and fall of  Venetian cloth production in the seventeenth century: the tradi-
tional views 
The subsequent seventeenth-century slump and then virtual collapse of 
the Venetian cloth industry (and of the Florentine and other Italian woollen 
industries) has traditionally been attributed essentially to internal factors. The 
most important, according to a litany of faults set forth by Sella himself, 
Carlo Cipolla, Brian Pullan, Fernand Braudel, was this industry’s ‘failure both 
to lower prices and to innovate’. That in turn supposedly reflects the roles of 
rigid guild restrictions, strictly enforced by the city government, excessive 
taxation, and, of course, the payment of ‘high wages’, another inevitable deus 
ex machina argument for industrial decline.89  
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Economic History”, 35, 1975, pp. 499-525; R. RAPP, Industry and Economic Decline in Seventeenth-
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Because the Venetians lost much of their Ottoman markets to the Eng-
lish cloth trade, during the seventeenth century, the ‘faults’ of the Venetian 
industry are then contrasted with the supposedly lower-cost ‘virtues’ of the 
English woollen cloth industry. We have no way of comparing labour costs in 
the two industries; but most economists take a dim view of the all-too-
common ‘high wage’ argument. If high living costs and high taxes may be 
factors in explaining high wages (as, for example, in the eighteenth-century 
Dutch Republic), nevertheless ‘high wages’ can be justified and maintained 
only if and when they equal the marginal revenue product of labour: i.e., the 
market value of the last unit of the commodity produced by the last worker 
hired. Certainly labour productivity can and did vary enormously; and gener-
ally low rural wages or low money-wage rates – a supposed advantage of the 
largely rural or small-town English woollen cloth industry – are explained by 
a productivity, set of skills, and education that were substantially inferior to 
that found in early-modern towns, which generally also enjoyed lower trans-
action costs in organising labour. 
Nor can it be proved that guild regulations, especially when chiefly de-
signed to ensure quality controls in manufacturing industries subject to ‘price-
making’ monopolistic-competition structures, are necessarily injurious to an 
industry’s fortunes. On the contrary, for luxury or fine cloth production, qual-
ity considerations (affecting the slope of the demand curve in that monopo-
listic competition) were generally a more important consideration than costs 
and prices; and thus guild regulations can be fully justified to ensure the qual-
ity controls and hence the industry’s reputation and market shares in foreign 
lands.90 Let us remember such guilds did not hinder the rise and expansion of 
the Flemish, Florentine, and indeed the Venetian cloth industries. Further-
more, the extent to which the English woollen cloth industry had, by the mid 
                                                                                                                           
De-Industrializaton of  the Republic of  Venice from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century, in The Rise and 
Decline of  Urban Industries, cit., pp.  41-61.  He notes the importance of plague in the 1630s, for 
industrial decline. 
90 See in particular these arguments in J. MUNRO, Urban Regulation and Monopolistic Competi-
tion in the Textile Industries of  the Late-Medieval Low Countries, in Textiles of  the Low Countries in 
European Economic History. Proceedings of  10th International Economic History Congress, E. AERTS, J. 
MUNRO eds., Leuven 1990 (Studies in Social and Economic History, 19), pp. 41-52; reprinted in 
J. MUNRO, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of  Late-Medieval England and the 
Low Countries, London 1994 (Variorum Collected Studies series CS 442); IDEM, The Symbiosis of  
Towns and Textiles, cit.,. For Venice itself, and the same role of guilds in the silk industry, see L. 
MOLÀ, The Silk Industry of  Renaissance Venice, Baltimore-London (The Johns Hopkins University 
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sixteenth century, become subject to Parliamentary legislation and regulation 
is often overlooked. 91 
Did the English, however, still enjoy a significant advantage in their wool 
supplies, as they had in the fifteenth century: a vital consideration when wools 
were so very important as the prime component of pre-finishing manufactur-
ing costs and as the prime determinant of textile quality?92 The answer this 
time, for the seventeenth century, is decisively no: in terms, at least, of the 
higher-valued, heavy-weight woollens. For, as noted earlier, England’s primacy 
in fine quality-wool production had now been decisively lost to Spanish merino 
wools: so much so that England was now importing substantial quantities of 
Spanish wools in order to produce, as a mixture with some of the best and 
few remaining high quality March wools, what were known as ‘Spanish med-
leys’, or ‘superfine’ broadcloths. Since the Venetian industry was also using 
Spanish merino wools, and since the transportation and merchandising costs in 
acquiring these Spanish wools were lower than those incurred by the far dis-
tant English industry, the Venetians should have enjoyed that cost advantage. 
In any event, no conceivable set of changes affecting Venetian productivity 
can possibly explain an industrial decline that was so sudden, so precipitous, 
and so very steep.  
 
The role of  England’s Levant Company: English textile exports to the Ottoman Empire, 
and the decline of  the Venetian woollen cloth industry, 1580-1720 
The true advantage that the English did enjoy, dating from the later six-
teenth century, was – as the Venetian advantage had once been – far more 
commercial than purely industrial. That commercial advantage had two pri-
mary components: institutional- diplomatic, in the form of the new Levant 
Company, and a superior naval technology. The explanation of the first re-
quires a brief history of the most important event in Ottoman-European re-
lations in the later sixteenth century. In 1570-71, the Ottoman Sultan Selim II 
succeeded in seizing Cyprus, and thus control of the Aegean Sea, from Ven-
ice, with a resulting massacre that horrified Christian Europe. The Papacy 
                                                      
91 See Great Britain, Record Commission (T.E. TOMLINS, J. RAITHBY, et. al, eds.), Statutes 
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then organized an alliance, effectively under Venetian control, which inflicted 
a truly decisive defeat on the Turkish armada in the Gulf of Corinth, known 
as the Battle of Lepanto, in October 1571, a victory that was essentially due 
to European superiority in naval artillery, and a victory that vanquished for-
ever any notions of ‘the invincibility of the Turks’. Indeed Ottoman naval 
power soon ‘declined rapidly’. The Ottomans, now concerned about the po-
tential dangers to their power in the Mediterranean basin, sought a new 
European alliance, one more reliable than the French had been, particularly as 
a counterweight to Venetian power.93 
The English quickly responded, for the Turks now offered them their 
very first major and most welcome opportunity to enter into and expand their 
Mediterranean trade.94 Ten years later, in 1581, the English crown authorized 
the creation of a new overseas joint-stock trading company, by far the most 
successful one formed in the sixteenth century: the Turkey Company, reor-
ganized, in 1591, as the Levant Company. What the Turks wanted in material 
terms, apart from diplomatic support, were arms and munitions, which the 
Levant Company exported to their domains in considerable numbers.  
What the English wanted was a new and most promising outlet for their 
textiles, and access to both raw silk and spices. Initially, the woollen textiles 
that the Levant Company sold in Ottoman markets were coarse, relatively 
cheap kerseys; and their sales seem to have been not that successful, despite 
Venetian complaints about competition from lower-priced textiles. Then, 
from the 1590s, Levant Company merchants began selling larger and larger 
quantities of the far finer and far more expensive Suffolk broadcloths, espe-
cially the Spanish Medley ‘superfines’, which soon superseded the kerseys and 
then rapidly gained a major share of Ottoman markets, at the direct expense 
of the Italian, French, and Dutch. Thus, from 1598 to 1634, the Company’s 
sales of broadcloths rose from just 750 to about 17,000 pieces, while those of 
kerseys fell from 18,031 to 2,300 pieces. According to Pagano di Divitiis, in 
1634, English woollens were accounting for 40 percent of sales in the Levan-
tine markets, while the Venetian and French shares had been reduced to 26 
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percent each, and the Dutch to just 8 percent.95 She also contends that the 
Levant Company’s chief return cargo in return for these woollens was Asian 
silk, far and away the single most imported raw material into seventeenth-
century England, accounting for 29.5 percent of all such imports, by value, in 
1622, 28.4 percent in 1640, 20.9 percent in 1669, and 23.4 percent in 1701.96  
One of her most significant observations about the Levant Company’s 
trade with the Ottoman empire concerns the balance of payments: very dif-
ferent indeed from what Ashtor had found for the Venetian Levant trade in 
the 1490s. For the Company’s payments for purchases in the Levant made in 
bullion and specie ranged from only 20 to 35 percent, almost the reverse of 
the statistics that Ashtor provided for Venice’s Levant trade in the 1490s.97 
Since then, evidently, European textile exports had diminished the relative 
need for precious metals in conducting this Levantine trade. 
One may wonder, however, why the Ottoman Empire served as such an 
important market for heavy-weight fine quality woollen cloths, such as those 
produced by both Venice and England, a commodity that was seemingly 
more suited (so to speak) for northern climates. Yet, by 1640, the Mediterra-
nean basin was accounting for 45.5 percent of the sales of English woollens, 
while northern Europe accounted for 46.9 percent, and the Americas for the 
remaining 7.6 percent; in the 1660s, the Mediterranean basin was now ac-
counting for over half, 56.5 precent of the market for these woollens, while 
northern Europe accounted for only 37.6 percent.98  
The explanation for the economic importance of the Ottoman Empire 
itself is a combination of population size and densities, topography, and es-
pecially climatic zones. In the later sixteenth century, the European and Asian 
portions contained at least sixteen million (Braudel), with another six million 
in Africa; and some estimates of the aggregate Ottoman population run to 
thirty-five million (Barkan), almost half of Europe’s total population in 1600, 
estimated at 77.9 million.99 Equally important is the fact that much of this 
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97 Ibid., p. 25, also citing R. DAVIS, Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant 
in the Eighteenth Century, London 1967, pp. 196-197. 
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Empire then consisted of high-plateaux lands – in the European (Ottoman) 
Balkans, in Asia Minor itself, and in neighbouring Safavid Persia – which be-
came very cold at night even in the summer months, and certainly very cold 
throughout the winter. As Ralph Davis has so eloquently commented, ‘when 
the cold gales of autumn blew from the uplands of Asia Minor and the Bal-
kans, the prosperous Turk or Persian counted himself lucky to be wrapped in 
the thickest and heaviest of English woollens’.100  
At the same time, in many warmer parts of Mediterranean lands, the Le-
vant Company was also selling even larger quantities of the semi-worsted or 
serge-type cloths, far lighter weight and much cheaper fabrics, which were the 
products of the aforementioned and so-called New Draperies.101 In 1640, 
when textiles still accounted for almost all of London’s exports, 92.3 percent 
by value, the woollens of the Old Draperies still exceeded the value of the 
products of the New Draperies (bays, says, serges, perpetuanas, etc.), but not 
by much: 48.9 percent for the former vs. 43.3 percent, for the latter.102 In the 
1660s, 24.23 percent of textiles from the New Draperies sold in the Mediter-
ranean went to Italy, 10.1 per cent to Portugal, and the largest share, 65.71 
percent to Spain (and the Spanish Americas).103 By 1700, English exports of 
cloth from the New Draperies had now increased, in absolute and relative 
terms, to account for 58.8 percent of the total textile exports by value ( £2.82 
million); high-quality broadcloths, accounted for 25.4 percent; and the 
cheaper, coarser kerseys, dozens, and other ‘narrow’ woollens, for the remain-
ing 15.8 percent.104  
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Braude’s ‘dumping thesis’ to explain the Levant Company’s success in marketing English 
woollen textiles 
Benjamin Braude has offered, however, an alternative hypothesis for the 
Levant Company’s success in marketing English woollen textiles in the Otto-
man Empire: namely, that it engaged in ‘dumping’. In other words, merchants 
of the Levant Company were selling such woollens there for a price below 
that charged to domestic customers of English woollen cloths.105 His thesis is 
that its merchants did so in order to gain access to an Ottoman commerce 
that would allow them to buy and import Levantine and Persian silk, which, 
as just noted from Pagano di Divitis’ research, was indeed far and away the 
Company’s most lucrative import into England. As Braude rightly notes, the 
Levant Company had a monopoly on this silk-import trade from the Levant, 
one that undoubtedly provided very high profits. But both Braude’s evidence 
and his logic for such ‘dumping’ are quite unconvincing. He compares the 
prices for English ‘cloth’ sold in both ‘London’ and Istanbul in the 1620s, us-
ing exchange rates (converting Turkish aspers into English sterling shillings) 
from the Levant Company Ledger Books.106 Even if the exchange rates are 
accurate, these ‘prices’ still remain meaningless, unless they can be applied to 
specific types of cloths. England, as already noted, produced a very wide 
range of cloths, from very cheap to ultra-expensive, as did most of its inter-
national competitors. Indeed, as also noted earlier, the organisation of cloth 
production and textile markets for higher priced fabrics, in later medieval and 
early modern Europe, was one of monopolistic competition, by which pro-
ducers and merchants sought to convince consumers that there were no suit-
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able substitutes, in terms of quality and price, for the specific, highly individ-
ual textile product being marketed. 
Thus we need to know what types of cloths are represented in Braude’s 
price lists: are they Winchombe kerseys, Devonshire dozens, West Country 
broadcloths, panni di Londra, or Sussex ‘superfine Spanish medleys’?.107 We are 
given no such information, which is also lacking in his one single source, the 
well known Beveridge collection on English prices. The one series that 
Braude cites is for ‘mixed coloured’ broadcloths that Westminister Abbey 
purchased each year for its servants: generally at 13s 4d per yard, from 1613 
to 1641; and they do not appear to be actual market prices.108 At these prices, 
these woollens were certainly in the luxury category. Their purchase, in the 
1620s, would have cost a master mason (Oxford-Cambridge) more than two 
weeks’ wages per yard; and for a complete broadcloth of 24 yards, that ma-
son would have had to spend 320 days’ wages, well more than a year’s annual 
wage income (at 210 days’ employment).109 Braude does not, however, cite 
another of Beveridge’s cloth price series: for broadcloths purchased for 
Westminister scholars.110 They were far cheaper, averaging only 7s 4d per yard 
(only 55 percent as much) during these same years. From Beveridge’s raw data 
and other sources, Phelps Brown and Hopkins have presented prices for 
other woollens, purchased for servants and scholars at Winchester and Eton 
Colleges, which, for the period 1615-40, averaged just 5s 0d and 6s 6d per 
yard, respectively.111 Thus Braude’s citation of one single price series for un-
usually expensive woollens (at Westminster) cannot possibly justify his charge 
that the Levant Company was ‘dumping’ woollens in Ottoman markets; nor is 
there any other evidence to make that case, which, to repeat, would require a 
comparison of English and Turkish prices for very similar if not identical 
fabrics, in the same years. 
                                                      
107 See, for example, the text in n. 83, above. 
108 W. BEVERIDGE, Prices and Wages in England from the Twelfth to the Nineteenth Century, I: Price 
Tables: Mercantile Era, London 1939 (Longman Green) reissued London:1965 (Frank Cass and 
Co, Ltd.), p. 183- 
109 The daily wage for master masons in Oxford and Cambridge was then 12d sterling 
(1s). H. PHELPS BROWN, S. HOPKINS, Seven Centuries of  Building Wages, in “Economica”, 22, 87, 
1955, pp. 195-206; reprinted in H. PHELPS BROWN, S. HOPKINS, A Perspective of  Wages and Prices, 
London 1981, pp. 1-12. 
110 W. BEVERIDGE, Prices and Wages, p. 193. 
111 Archives of the British Library of Economic and Political Science: Phelps Brown Papers. A NON-MERCHANTILIST APPROACH  949
In any event, why, from the forgoing analysis, would the Levant Company 
have needed or wanted to engage in ‘dumping’, i.e., in presumably selling such 
cloths at a loss? For there is no evidence that that mutually harmful technique 
was in any way necessary to gain access to Ottoman trade. Furthermore, any 
such ‘dumping’ would have reduced the sales revenues and net incomes nec-
essary to purchase the silks and spices – even if unquestionably that import 
trade was more profitable than the export trade to the Ottoman Empire. In 
other words, why would the Levant Company have adopted a strategy that 
required the export of even more specie, especially when such exports (with-
out a costly licence) was still illegal.112 
 
English naval power and Mediterranean commerce 
The other advantage that allowed the English to gain commercial su-
premacy in Ottoman and other Mediterranean markets by the later seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries was a decisively superior and also lower cost 
naval technology. As Ralph Davis has demonstrated, the English were now 
building and operating far larger, far stronger oak-based carracks, which were 
also more heavily gunned (with ranks of up to 60 powerful cannons) than 
were those of any of their rivals. Both pirates and Muslim corsairs – which 
had so menaced the Mediterranean shipping lanes – learned at their very 
painful cost to stay away from the English galleons. To be sure the operating 
costs were considerably higher than those for rival ships (about ten percent), 
but the insurance rates were correspondingly much lower. The greater cer-
tainty that cargoes would safely and speedily reach their destinations was cer-
tainly also a very powerful advantage. All such factors help explain why the 
English gained, as well, such a large share of the Mediterranean ‘carrying’ 
trades.113 It is indeed significant to note that the total tonnage of the English 
                                                      
112 From January 1364, Statute 36 Edwardi III, stat. 1, c. 2 had forbidden the export of 
any English coin (without a royal licence) as well as all forms of bullion: in  Statutes of  the 
Realm, I, p. 383.  In May 1663,  Parliament repealed its provisions concerning bullion exports: 
in Statute 15 Carolus II,  c. 7, in Statutes of  the Realm, V, p.  451, sec. 9. That legislation was 
influenced by arguments  set forth by the East India Company: in  THOMAS MUN, England's 
Treasure by Forraign Trade [1664] (reissued Oxford 1937). 
113 R. DAVIS, England and the Mediterranean, cit., pp. 126-137. See also IDEM, English Overseas 
Trade, 1500 – 1700, London 1973, pp. 20-31; IDEM, The Rise of  the English Shipping Industry, cit., 
pp. 1-57, 228-256; G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, English Merchants, cit., pp. 41-55; see in particular, p. 
43: ‘While Holland was pre-eminent in the development of merchant shipping, England outdid 
all other countries in the design of warships’. JOHN MUNRO  950 
merchant fleet rose from just 50,000 tons in 1572 to 340,00 tons in 1686.114 
At the same time, as several historians have argued, and most recently and 
most eloquently Pagano di Divitiis, the Venetian and other Italian (and also 
Spanish) ship-building industries were experiencing a veritable ‘crisis’ from 
the 1570s, especially in constructing larger vessels, from soaring costs that 
primarily reflected a scarcity of suitable ship timbers in the Mediterranean 
zone, compared to the very abundant and low cost supply available in the 
Baltic zone, but even within England itself; and for the Italians to import 
northern timber or to buy northern-built ships, though an obvious and in-
creasingly used alternative, was still relatively costly in terms of transport and 
transaction costs.115  
 
The Dutch and English East India Companies, the spice trade, and the decline of  Venice 
in the seventeenth century 
Finally, the rapid seventeenth-century decline of the Venetian cloth in-
dustry may also be related to adverse developments in the spice trade, which 
certainly had a very major impact on the overall decline of Venetian com-
merce in the seventeenth century. The Levant Company, in trading with the 
Ottoman Levant, was also anxious to secure some access (via Aleppo) to that 
spice trade; and some its key merchants and investors were responsible for 
the establishment of by far the most powerful of the new overseas joint-
stock trading companies: the East India Company, chartered in 1600, with a 
monopoly on English trade with the Indian Ocean basin. At almost the same 
time, the Dutch formed the Vereinige Oost-Indisch Compagnie (United East 
India Co: VOC), for the same purpose. Taking advantage of disruptions in the 
European spice trade in the 1590s, this time involving both the Portuguese and 
the Venetians, the Dutch and English rivals engaged in a race to establish a di-
rect sea route to the Indies (and to India itself). The two, but most especially 
the Dutch Company, not only destroyed much (if not all) of the remaining 
Portuguese commercial power in the Indies, but succeeded where the Portu-
guese had failed: in securing an almost complete monopsony over the East In-
dies spice trade. Though the Dutch, in the 1622 ‘Massacre of Amboyna’, 
evicted the English from the East Indies, the latter came to benefit more by 
concentrating their energies on securing control over the commerce of India 
itself. Certainly Venetian commercial power in the spice trade rapidly dwindled. 
                                                      
114 Ibid., Table 2.1, p. 43; R. DAVIS, The Rise of  the English Shipping Industry, cit., pp. 7, 10, 15. 
115 G. PAGANO DE DIVITIIS, English Merchants, cit., pp. 36-46, and the many secondary 
sources cited here. A NON-MERCHANTILIST APPROACH  951
The loss of that power, in buying spices via Ottoman ports, may have also con-
tributed to the decline in their woollen sales in the Ottoman Empire – though 
the other factors just cited may have been more important. 
 
Conclusions on Bullion Flows and Europe’s Balance of  Payments with the Islamic World. 
That export trade of the two East India Companies in the Indian Ocean 
basin involved a vast expansion in silver shipments. From 1660 to 1720, their 
combined export was 3,437,557.2 kg of silver; and for the English East India 
Company itself, during these six decades, silver accounted for 81.35 percent 
of the precious metals shipped to India; and ‘treasure’ accounted for 78.94 
per cent and thus merchandise sales accounted for only 21.06 percent of the 
value of the Company’s imports from Asia into Europe. (Tables 6-8)116 That 
represents a far greater ‘deficit’ in Europe’s balance of payments in this re-
gion, compared to both the Venetian and then English trade in the Levant, 
and with the Ottoman Empire generally – where of course textiles played a 
far greater role (and thus diminishing the relative role of precious metals) 
than they could possibly have done in the Indian Ocean basin. 
But once, more such silver shipments posed no serious problems for the 
European economy, since the influx of silver from the Spanish American 
mines generally exceeded the outflow. And if that silver surplus was diminish-
ing in the later seventeenth century it was soon replenished, from the early 
eighteenth century, by new silver mining booms in Mexico.117 From the per-
                                                      
116 F.S. GAASTRA, The Exports of  Precious Metal from Europe to Asia by the Dutch East India 
Company, 1602-1795 A.D., in Precious Metals in the Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICH-
ARDS, Durham N.C. 1983, pp. 447-476; K.N. CHAUDHURI, Treasure and Trade Balances: the East 
India Company's Export Trade, 1660-1720, in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 21, 1968, pp. 
480-502, Table 1, pp. 497-498. In the English East India Company’s early history, however, 
from 1601 to 1624, it exported a total of £753,336 in precious metals (‘treasure’) and £351,236 
in merchandise, for an aggregate export value of £1,104,572, so that precious metals then 
accounted for a somewhat lower percentage of the total value:  68.20%.  IDEM, The East India 
Company and the Export of  Treasure in the Early Seventeenth Century, in “Economic History 
Review”, 2nd ser., 16, 1, 1963, p. 24. 
117 P. BAKEWELL, Mining in Colonial Spanish America, in The Cambridge History of  Latin Amer-
ica, 2, Colonial Latin America, ed. L. BETHELL, Cambridge-New York 1984 (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press), pp. 105-151; P. BAKEWELL, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546 
– 1700, Cambridge 1971; H.E. CROSS, South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550-1750, 
in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J.F. RICHARDS , Durham N.C. 
1983, pp. 425-439; R.L. GARNER, Long-term Silver Mining Trends in Spanish America: A Comparative 
Analysis of  Peru and Mexico, in “American Historical Review”, 67, 1987, 3, pp. 405-430; D.A. 
BRADING, Mexican Silver Mining in the Eighteenth Century: the Revival of  Zacatecas, in “Hispanic 
American Historical Review”, 50, 1970, 4, pp. 665-681. JOHN MUNRO  952 
spective of four centuries of economic history, we may observe that, in ex-
porting so much ‘treasure’, silver especially, to the Levant and Asia – most of 
which was in the Islamic world — the Venetians, the Portuguese, the English, 
the Dutch (and other Europeans) promoted the growth of the European and 
indeed the global economy, through the enormous expansion in trade that 
such precious metals generated. The fact that so much of these precious-
metal exports took place during the inflationary Price Revolution era and the 
fact that the bimetallic ratio had risen (in England) from 10.33:1 in 1464 to 
14.485 in 1660 together prove that western Europe, despite such exports, had 
long enjoyed a surplus of silver.118  
                                                      
118 My own calculations of the official bimetallic mint ratios indicate a rise from 12.109 in 
1604 to 13.363 in 1612 to 13.348 in 1623 to 14.485 in 1660 to 15.210 in 1718 (remaining at this 
level until 1815). Based on data supplied in CH. CHALLIS, Appendix I: Mint Output, 1220-1985, in 
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Table 5. Venetian Woollen Cloth Production, 1516-1723, in quinquennial means 
 
Years    Cloth   Years   Cloth 
   Outputs        Outputs 
            
1516-20   2,416.60   1621-25   15,659.40
        
1521-25   3,647.80   1626-30   16,818.40
        
1526-30   4,593.80   1631-35   12,340.20
        
1531-35   5,492.20   1636-40   12,393.40
        
1536-40   5,078.40   1641-45   12,780.40
        
1541-45   7,891.40   1646-50   9,810.00
        
1546-50   10,151.60   1651-55   10,696.00
        
1551-55   11,547.80   1656-60   8,567.20
        
1556-60   16,131.60   1661-65   7,966.40
        
1561-65   16,075.80   1666-70   6,464.00
        
1566-70   18,513.20   1671-75   6,493.20
        
1571-75   17,512.20   1676-80   4,069.40
        
1576-80   17,986.00   1681-85   3,673.80
        
1581-85   19,709.40   1686-90   2,058.20
        
1586-90   19,093.20   1691-95   2,863.00
            
1591-95    23,393.00   1696-00  2,426.40  
          
1596-00    21,567.20   1701-05  2,453.80  
          
1601-05    23,572.80   1706-10  2,132.20  
          
1606-10    18,535.40   1711-15  2,019.00  
          
1611-15    17,917.40   1716-20  2,141.00  
          
1616-20    19,682.80   1721-23   1822.33  
 
Sources: 
W. PANCIERA, L’Arte matrice, cit., Table 2, pp. 42-43, which also extends the series from 1713 to 
1723. I wish to offer my sincere thanks to Professor Panciera, who sent me a photo-copy of 
the document from the Venetian archives (ASCW, Cinque savi b. 476) containing the original 
data. His table corrects many errors that had been reproduced in the much better know series 
of statistics on Venetian woollen cloth production, in D. SELLA, Rise and Fall of  the Venetian 
Woollen Industry, cit. Unfortunately, I found it necessary to correct his statistics, from the origi-
nal archival document, for the following four years: 1521, 1618, 1639, 1662. A NON-MERCHANTILIST APPROACH  959
Table 6 . Exports of Silver to Asia by the Dutch and English East India Companies, 
in kilograms of fine silver, in decennial means, 1660-69 to 1710-19 
 
 
Decade  Dutch East  British East  Total Silver 
  India Co.  India Co.  Shipments 
  kg of silver  kg of silver  kg of silver 
      
1660-69  11,563.1 5,729.6  17,292.7 
     
1670-79  11,854.6 11,364.0 23,218.6 
     
1680-89  18,847.0 29,276.0 48,123.0 
     
1690-99  27,720.9 18,179.0 45,899.9 
     
1700-09  37,392.9 36,294.3 73,687.2 
     
1710-19  37,108.1 41,133.6  78241.7 
Sources: F.S. GAASTRA, The Exports of  Precious Metal, cit., pp. 447-476; K.N. CHAUDHURI, Treas-
ure and Trade Balances, cit., pp. 497-498. 
 
 
Table 7 . Export Statistics of the English East India Company: Exports  
of Precious Metals in kilograms and Pounds Sterling of England,  
in decennial means: 1660-69 to 1710-19 
 
 
Decades  Silver kg  Silver value Gold kg Gold Value Total Treasure Silver  Gold as
    in £ sterling   in £ sterling  in £ sterling as percentpercent
              
1660-69  5,729.600 51,445.568 175.140 22,576.832 74,022.400 69.50% 30.50%
   
1670-79  11,364.000 102,063.8501,015.300 132,027.550 234,091.400 43.60% 56.40%
   
1680-89  29,276.000 262,839.775 929.070 120,867.926 383,707.700 68.50% 31.50%
   
1690-99  18,179.000 163,230.172 24.690 3,331.228 166,561.400 98.00% 2.00%
   
1700-09  36,294.300 325,887.606 79.540 11,121.294 337,008.900 96.70% 3.30%
   
1710-19  41,133.600 369,189.591 14.970 2,228.509 371,418.100 99.40% 0.60%
   
   
TOTAL 141,976.5001,274,656.5632,238.710 292,153.337 1,566,809.900 81.35% 18.65%
 
Source: K.N. CHAUDHURI, Treasure and Trade Balances, cit., Table 1, pp. 497-498. JOHN MUNRO  960 
Table 8. The English East India Company's Export Trade to India in Treasure and 
Merchandise 
in pounds sterling: in decennial means, 1660-69 to 1710-19 
       
Decades Total Treasure  Merchandise Total Value  Treasure  Merchandise
  in £ sterling  in £ sterling  in £ sterling  percent  Percent 
       
1660-69  74,022.400 41,085.200 115,107.600 64.31%  35.69% 
        
1670-79  234,091.400 89,990.800 324,082.200 72.23%  27.77% 
        
1680-89  383,707.700 56,170.200 439,877.900 87.23%  12.77% 
        
1690-99  166,561.400 72,065.200 238,626.600 69.80%  30.20% 
        
1700-09  337,008.900 60,876.500 397,885.400 84.70%  15.30% 
        
1710-19  371,418.100 97,771.300 469,189.400 79.16%  20.84% 
        
        
 
Source: Calculated from: K.N. CHAUDHURI, Treasure and Trade Balances, cit., Table 1, pp. 497-
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